Williamson v. Kijakazi

Background

Amy Williamson applied for Social Security Disability Benefits and Supplemental Security Income in 2019. The Social Security Administration denied her application initially and on reconsideration. An administrative law judge later denied the claim, and the Appeals Council affirmed that decision.

Williamson filed this federal case seeking review. Under the parties’ stipulation, the court remanded the case to the Commissioner of Social Security for further administrative proceedings. The remand resulted in an outright award of benefits. Williamson received $65,811.50 in past-due benefits, and the Social Security Administration withheld 25% of those benefits—$16,452.88, rounded in the motion to $16,453—for representative fees.

The court had previously awarded Williamson’s counsel $8,240 under the Equal Access to Justice Act, a federal law that can require the government to pay certain litigation fees. Counsel then moved for an award under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). Counsel requested either the full $16,453 award, followed by a direct refund of the $8,240 earlier award to Williamson, or a net § 406(b) payment of $8,213 after subtracting the earlier award.

Reasonableness of the § 406(b) Fee

Section 406(b) permits a court to award a successful Social Security claimant’s lawyer a reasonable fee of no more than 25% of the claimant’s past-due benefits. Because Williamson’s fee agreement provided for 25% of past-due benefits after a successful appeal, the agreement and statute permitted the requested fee.

The court independently reviewed whether the fee was reasonable. It found that counsel’s representation was successful, that the fee agreement was not unreasonable when entered, and that counsel had competently represented Williamson. The administrative record exceeded 1,800 pages, and the court found no evidence of significant or undue delay.

The court also considered the relationship between the fee and the time spent on the case. Counsel had previously reported 46.3 hours of work in support of the earlier fee request. Dividing $16,453 by 46.3 hours produced an approximate hourly rate of $355, and any work after remand would reduce that rate. The court concluded that the full award would not be disproportionate or a windfall. It therefore found $16,453 reasonable.

Refund of the Earlier Fee Award

A lawyer may receive awards under both the Equal Access to Justice Act and § 406(b), but the lawyer must refund the smaller fee to the claimant. Because the $8,240 Equal Access to Justice Act award was smaller, counsel had to refund that amount to Williamson.

Williamson asked the court to order an indirect refund by awarding counsel only the $8,213 difference between the two fee amounts. The Commissioner did not oppose the motion and took no position on the net-payment request, but asked the court to evaluate the reasonableness of the full § 406(b) fee if the court approved that method.

The court declined to use the requested indirect method. It stated that Williamson gave no explanation for using that method, did not object to the usual method, and requested the full award as an alternative. The court therefore awarded the full $16,453 to counsel, subject to counsel’s refund of $8,240 to Williamson.

Order

The court granted Williamson’s motion for attorney’s fees, awarded her counsel $16,453 in reasonable fees under § 406(b), and ordered counsel to refund $8,240 to Williamson. Judge Susan Richard Nelson entered the order.