TIG Insurance Company v. Missionary Oblates of Mary Immaculate

Background

The order addresses seven motions in limine, meaning requests made before trial to limit or exclude evidence. TIG Insurance Company filed six motions. Doe Nos. 86, 329, and 330 filed one motion, and Missionary Oblates of Mary Immaculate joined that motion and the Does’ responses to TIG’s motions.

The opinion identifies two issues for trial: whether the Oblates knew or should have known, before Fitzgerald abused the Intervenors, that his abuse would likely recur if no action was taken; and whether TIG issued an umbrella policy to the Oblates for the period from June 1, 1978, to June 1, 1979.

TIG’s Motion No. 1: Integrity Policy

TIG sought to exclude an umbrella policy issued by Integrity Insurance Company for June 1, 1979, through December 31, 1980, along with testimony about that policy. TIG argued that the policy was irrelevant and that admitting it could waste time or confuse or mislead the jury.

The court denied the motion. It found that the Integrity Policy was relevant because, considered with the Oblates’ purchase of umbrella policies in effect from 1973 to 1978, it tended to show that the Oblates intended to include umbrella insurance in their program. The court said TIG could argue at trial that the policy should receive little weight and could address possible confusion through witness examination and argument.

TIG’s Motion No. 2: Cash-Disbursements Journal Testimony

TIG sought to exclude testimony by the Oblates’ corporate representatives, Carrie Huff and Rufus Whitley, about a purported cash-disbursements journal, including the meaning of handwritten markings and annotations. TIG argued that they lacked personal knowledge of the journal’s contents.

The court denied the motion to the extent it sought to exclude testimony directed at authenticating the journal and granted the motion to the extent it sought to exclude testimony about the journal’s meaning and significance. The court explained that witnesses generally may testify only about matters within their personal knowledge, but a witness authenticating an ancient document need not have personal knowledge of the document’s contents. The journal could potentially be authenticated under the ancient-documents rule because it was more than 20 years old and could be shown to be in a condition that raised no suspicion about its authenticity and to have been found in a place where it would likely be.

TIG’s Motion No. 3: Excluding the Cash-Disbursements Journal

TIG sought to exclude the journal itself based on hearsay, authentication, the requirement that an original document be used to prove its contents, and the risk of jury confusion or unfair prejudice. The court denied the motion.

The court found that TIG had not shown before trial that the Does would be unable to authenticate the journal as an ancient document. The court also rejected TIG’s argument that authentication required a witness with personal knowledge of the journal’s creation, maintenance, or purpose. If authenticated, the journal could fall within the ancient-documents exception to the hearsay rule. The court said TIG could challenge the journal’s weight through its witnesses, cross-examination, and attorney argument. The court did not address TIG’s separate argument about the business-records exception because the Does relied on the ancient-documents exception instead.

TIG’s Motion No. 4: Insurance Expert Jeffrey E. Thomas

TIG sought to exclude all opinions and testimony from the Does’ insurance expert, Professor Jeffrey E. Thomas. The court denied the motion.

The court found that Thomas had extensive specialized knowledge of insurance law and insurance-industry custom and practice. Although the court viewed the issue as close and found that Thomas’s report did not always clearly connect his expertise to his opinions, it concluded that the weaknesses TIG identified generally concerned the credibility and factual basis of his testimony rather than its admissibility. The court also considered Thomas’s deposition testimony, which more clearly connected the record evidence, his insurance expertise, and his opinions.

TIG’s Motion No. 5: Testimony by the Does and Doe 155

TIG sought to prevent Does 86, 329, 330, and 155 from testifying at trial. The court denied the motion to the extent the Does’ testimony concerned the circumstances of their abuse and necessary introductory testimony, and granted the motion in all other respects.

The court found that testimony about the circumstances of the abuse was relevant to the context of the case and to whether the Oblates knew or should have known from Fitzgerald’s past abuse that he would abuse again. The court found no shown relevance for testimony about other matters, such as injuries, monetary damages, and other consequences of the abuse, given the two issues to be tried. The court said potential prejudice or confusion could be addressed through cross-examination, attorney argument, and jury instructions.

TIG’s Motion No. 6: Abuse-History Expert Philip Jenkins

TIG sought to exclude the opinions and testimony of Professor Philip Jenkins, the Does’ expert on the history of child sexual abuse. The court granted the motion.

The court identified three problems. First, much of Jenkins’s testimony about changing social attitudes, the historical minimization of child sexual abuse, and organizational responses would not help the jury decide whether the Oblates knew or should have known that future abuse by Fitzgerald was highly likely. Second, an opinion that experts before 1977 or 1980 believed abusers were unlikely to reoffend after therapy or treatment was not supported by sufficient facts or data tying that view to the Oblates or to Fitzgerald’s treatment. Third, Jenkins’s analysis of the evidence about Fitzgerald’s alleged abuse was largely factual and did not apply his expertise as a historian through reliable methods. The court therefore excluded his proffered testimony under the expert-evidence rules.

The Does’ Motion: Evidence of the 1960s Incidents

The Does sought to exclude evidence of two earlier alleged acts involving Fitzgerald: a 1963 incident in Henry, Illinois, and a 1966 or 1967 incident in Sisseton, South Dakota. They argued that the incidents did not involve physical injury as Minnesota insurance law defines that term and therefore were not similar to the abuse they suffered.

The court denied the motion. Although Minnesota law interprets bodily injury in an insurance policy to require physical injury and not merely nonphysical harm, the court held that sexual-abuse incidents without physical injury could still be relevant to whether future sexual abuse—whether injury-causing or not—was substantially probable.

Order

The court ordered that TIG’s Motion No. 1 was DENIED; Motion No. 2 was DENIED to the extent it sought exclusion of authentication-directed testimony and GRANTED to the extent it sought exclusion of testimony about the journal’s meaning and significance; Motion No. 3 was DENIED; Motion No. 4 was DENIED; Motion No. 5 was DENIED to the extent the Does’ testimony concerned the circumstances of their abuse and necessary introductory testimony and GRANTED in all other respects; Motion No. 6 was GRANTED; and the Intervenors’ motion was DENIED.