Sagataw v. Frey

Background

Camp Nenookaasi occupied five different locations on City-owned property beginning January 1, 2024. The plaintiffs—Cheryl Sagataw, DeAnthony Barnes, Roberta Strong, and Travis Neloms—alleged that they were residents of the camp’s first location and sued Mayor Jacob Frey in his individual and official capacities. They sought emergency relief preventing the Mayor from forcibly removing camp residents and clearing the camp. Their theories included alleged violations of the Fourth, Fourteenth, and Eighth Amendments. The court denied their first request from the bench on January 3, and the camp was cleared the next day.

After the camp moved to a fourth location on 28th Street between 11th and 12th Avenues, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint that added a claim under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act. They then filed a second motion for a temporary restraining order seeking to prevent Mayor Frey from clearing the camp from that fourth location.

Reasoning

The court held that an uncontrolled fire on February 29 destroyed everything at the fourth location, including the camp’s tents, yurts, and heating equipment. The camp then moved to a fifth location. Because the motion specifically sought to prevent removal of the camp from its fourth location, the court concluded that the fire meant the requested relief could no longer affect that site.

The plaintiffs argued that the court should treat the motion as addressing the fifth location. The court rejected that approach. First, the record contained almost no information about the fifth location, including whether any plaintiff lived there. The court noted that prospective injunctive or declaratory relief requires an ongoing injury or a real and immediate threat of future injury, and the record did not establish that requirement.

Second, the record did not show Mayor Frey’s specific plans for the fifth location. It did not establish whether officials would provide notice, make social services available, involve police, seize property, provide shelter beds, or take other particular actions. The court said that deciding the motion without those facts would require relying on hypotheticals.

Third, the plaintiffs suggested that Camp Nenookaasi was a community rather than a particular place and that any future removal within Minneapolis would be unlawful. The court explained that the camp itself was not the plaintiff; the four named individuals were. Any injunction therefore would need to address their individual circumstances. The court also found no authority supporting an injunction that would follow the camp to any City-owned property it might occupy.

The court further explained that Article III of the Constitution limits federal courts to actual cases and controversies. Although it might not be speculative that the Mayor would eventually clear the camp, the details of any future closure—including facts relevant to the plaintiffs’ legal theories—were speculative on the existing record.

Disposition

The court denied as moot the plaintiffs’ Second Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. It separately denied the plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend Address in Second Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. The order resolved the requested emergency motions on mootness and lack of supporting factual information; it did not decide whether the plaintiffs’ constitutional or Americans with Disabilities Act claims were legally valid.