Faul v. Lejeune

Background

Scott William Faul filed two petitions for a writ of habeas corpus, a procedure used to challenge unlawful custody. In Faul VII, against Warden Michael Lejeune, he argued that his parole eligibility date was incorrectly calculated under 18 U.S.C. § 4206(d) and sought immediate release. In Faul VIII, against Warden Mark W. King, he challenged the United States Parole Commission’s denial of parole, arguing that the decision lacked a rational basis, violated his First Amendment rights, and relied on an unconstitutionally vague statute.

Faul also moved to prevent the Bureau of Prisons from transferring him from FCI Sandstone and moved for appointment of counsel. He was transferred to Oklahoma City and then to a federal correctional institution in Milan, Michigan while the motions were pending.

The document was signed by John F. Docherty, United States Magistrate Judge, as an Order and Report and Recommendation.

Faul VII: Parole-eligibility calculation

The court declined to resolve whether § 4206(d) required Faul to serve 30 years or 40 years before becoming eligible for parole consideration. As of February 2023, he had served 40 years, so he was eligible for consideration under either interpretation. The court also explained that eligibility for consideration did not create an automatic right to release. Section 4206(d) allowed the Commission to deny release if it determined there was a reasonable probability that the prisoner would commit a federal, state, or local crime.

Because the Commission had made that finding in Faul’s parole case, the dispute over the timing of his eligibility was moot. The court therefore recommended denying Faul VII.

Faul VIII: Challenge to the parole denial

The court reviewed the Commission’s denial under a limited standard. It could determine whether the Commission acted outside its legal authority or violated the Constitution, but it could not reweigh the evidence or review the Commission’s ultimate judgment among permissible parole decisions.

The court found a rational basis for the denial. The Commission considered the seriousness of Faul’s offenses, his continued denial of responsibility, his statements challenging the legitimacy of the government and courts, his lack of remorse, and his limited participation in programming addressing rehabilitation and criminal thinking. The court concluded that the Commission could consider those matters when assessing whether Faul would commit another crime or follow parole conditions.

The court rejected Faul’s First Amendment claim. It reasoned that the Commission considered his statements as evidence relevant to recidivism risk, not simply to punish him for holding political views or criticizing the government. The court also rejected his claim that § 4206(d)’s recidivism provision was unconstitutionally vague. The statute gave the Commission discretion but required it to assess whether there was a reasonable probability that the prisoner would commit a crime, and it identified information the Commission was required to consider. The court found the provision valid both on its face and as applied to Faul.

The court therefore recommended denying Faul VIII.

Temporary restraining-order motions

The court recommended denying the motions seeking to prevent Faul’s transfer because the transfer had already occurred, making those requests moot. It also stated that, even if the transfer had not occurred, federal law made Bureau of Prisons placement decisions unreviewable by the courts. The court concluded that it retained jurisdiction over the habeas petitions despite the transfer because Faul had filed them while confined in the District of Minnesota and the transfer occurred afterward.

Motion to appoint counsel

The court denied Faul’s motion for appointment of counsel. It explained that there is no general constitutional right to a lawyer in habeas proceedings and that counsel may be provided when the interests of justice require it. Because briefing was complete, no evidentiary hearing was needed, and Faul had presented his claims effectively without a lawyer, the court found no basis for appointing counsel. The court also described the request as moot because it recommended denying the petitions.

Disposition and review procedure

The document recommends that both habeas petitions and both temporary restraining-order motions be denied. It separately orders that the motion to appoint counsel be denied. The notice states that the Report and Recommendation is not directly appealable to the Eighth Circuit and that written objections may be filed within 14 days after service under the cited local rule.