Sanders v. BNSF Railway Co.

Background

The case arose under the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA), which prohibits a railroad from retaliating against an employee for certain good-faith safety-related reports, assistance with safety investigations, or refusals to violate railroad-safety laws or rules. After the court previously denied BNSF’s request for summary judgment, the case went to a jury. The jury found that BNSF unlawfully retaliated against Don Sanders and awarded him $611,797 in backpay and benefits, $250,000 for emotional distress, and $8.6 million in punitive damages. The court later reduced the punitive-damages award to the FRSA’s $250,000 cap and awarded $78,010.24 in front pay and future benefits. The opinion states that Sanders’s total recovery was $1,189,807.24 before the attorney-fee and cost award addressed here.

BNSF’s motion for judgment as a matter of law

BNSF moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b) for judgment as a matter of law, which would have required setting aside the verdict because no legally sufficient evidence supported a reasonable jury’s decision. The court denied the motion.

The court held that sufficient evidence supported the jury’s findings that Sanders engaged in protected FRSA conduct and that his protected conduct contributed to his termination. The evidence included Sanders’s reports of track defects, entry of slow orders, refusals to bypass normal safety-reporting procedures, and reports to Human Resources. The court found that the good-faith question was one the jury could decide based on witness credibility and rejected BNSF’s arguments that the timing of Sanders’s reports or his call to the Federal Railroad Administration established bad faith.

The court also found evidence of retaliatory motive, including the supervisor’s hostility toward Sanders’s safety-related conduct, changes to Sanders’s work schedule and work location after he reported concerns to Human Resources, surveillance for alleged time theft, an extensive termination recommendation, and harsher treatment than similarly situated employees accused of the same violation. The court further held that BNSF did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that it would have terminated Sanders without his protected conduct. In particular, similarly situated employees were not terminated, and the disciplinary review was not sufficiently independent from the supervisor whom the jury could find had acted retaliatorily.

The court also upheld the jury’s punitive-damages award as reduced to the statutory cap. It found evidence that the supervisor acted with reckless or callous disregard for Sanders’s rights and intentionally violated federal law. Although BNSF had policies and other measures intended to prevent retaliation, the court found evidence that the internal review process was not independent and that BNSF did not follow a policy requiring review by the Assistant Vice President for the Twin Cities Division before Sanders’s termination.

BNSF’s motion for a new trial

BNSF alternatively moved under Rule 59 for a new trial. The court denied that motion. It concluded that BNSF had not shown prejudicial error or that the verdict was against the clear, overwhelming, or great weight of the evidence.

The court rejected BNSF’s challenges to omitted jury instructions. It found that BNSF did not show that the omitted instructions about personnel decisions, business judgment, or an honestly held belief were required, legally correct as proposed, or likely to have affected the verdict. The court also rejected BNSF’s challenge to the admission of scorecard data and an incentive-compensation plan, finding the evidence relevant to whether managers had financial incentives to discourage safety reports and slow orders and finding no demonstrated unfair prejudice.

The court also rejected BNSF’s challenge to the $250,000 emotional-distress award. Medical or psychological testimony was not required, and Sanders’s testimony about changing jobs, financial effects on his family, loss of health insurance and a pension, and depression, together with his wife’s testimony, supported the award.

Attorney fees and costs

Sanders moved for attorney fees and costs under the FRSA’s fee-shifting provision. The court found that Sanders was the prevailing party because the jury’s verdict was essentially entirely in his favor. Sanders requested $1,194,674.50 in attorney fees and $62,913.57 in costs.

The court found the requested hourly rates reasonable based on counsel’s experience, supporting declarations, and local market rates. It also found most of the requested hours reasonable and rejected BNSF’s request for a general percentage reduction. The court deducted $88,894 for time spent on a mock trial because the mock trial was used to improve the attorneys’ trial presentation rather than to prepare Sanders or a witness. The court did not deduct fees for Sanders’s earlier administrative proceedings before the Occupational Safety and Health Administration because pursuing that process was required before bringing the court action.

For costs, the court disallowed the $28,498.22 in mock-trial costs and made the other adjustments described in the opinion. It allowed the video-deposition costs, finding that the recordings were reasonably obtained even though they were not ultimately used at trial.

Disposition

The order states that BNSF’s motion for judgment as a matter of law was DENIED and BNSF’s motion for a new trial was DENIED. Sanders’s motion for attorney fees and costs was GRANTED in part. The court ordered BNSF to pay $1,105,780.50 in attorney fees and $34,415.35 in litigation expenses and nontaxable costs, and directed that judgment be entered accordingly.