Doe v. Barr

Background

John Doe filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, a procedure allowing a person to challenge government custody or restrictions that violate federal law. He also asked to proceed under a pseudonym. Doe had been released from immigration detention on a $2,000 bond after an immigration judge held a hearing required by a Third Circuit decision concerning prolonged detention. Before releasing him, an Immigration and Customs Enforcement officer required him to sign an order of supervision. The order imposed conditions including medical or psychiatric examinations upon request, limits on travel outside New York, reporting and information requirements, and requirements related to obtaining travel documents.

Doe said that an ICE officer told him he would not be released unless he signed the order, and that he signed because he was frightened. The Government did not directly dispute his account, stating that it did not know what had been said during his release. Doe challenged the supervision order under the Administrative Procedure Act and the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.

Pseudonym

The court granted Doe’s unopposed motion to proceed under a pseudonym. It found that the case involved highly sensitive and personal information, including Doe’s HIV status, history of abuse, and history of mental illness. The court also noted Doe’s claimed risk of harm, persecution, and torture if returned to Haiti, his prior use of a pseudonym in the case, and the absence of opposition from the Government.

Statutory and regulatory authority

The court reviewed 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), which provides that certain people ordered removed who are released from detention must be subject to the supervision terms described in § 1231(a)(3). Those terms include periodic appearances before an immigration officer, possible medical or psychiatric examinations, providing information under oath, and obeying reasonable written restrictions on conduct or activities.

The court also reviewed agency regulations concerning bond determinations and supervision orders. It agreed with Doe that the regulation governing supervision orders applied to people released under a particular agency bond procedure, 8 C.F.R. § 241.4, and that Doe was instead released after a bond hearing conducted under the Third Circuit’s decision. But the court held that the statute itself gave the agency authority to impose the supervision order. Because the parties did not dispute that Doe belonged to the group covered by § 1231(a)(6), the court concluded that the statute required him to be subject to the supervision terms after release.

The court also rejected Doe’s argument that the order was invalid because an ICE official, rather than an immigration judge, imposed it. The court found that the statute did not assign this authority to a particular agency official and that Doe cited no authority requiring an immigration judge to impose the order. The court therefore held that the agency had not exceeded its statutory authority and had not violated the Administrative Procedure Act.

Procedural due process

The court rejected Doe’s Fifth Amendment due-process claim as well. It applied the balancing approach from Mathews v. Eldridge, considering Doe’s private interest, the risk of an erroneous deprivation, and the Government’s interests. The court found that Doe’s interest was significant but less substantial than it would have been if he were detained. It found little risk of an erroneous deprivation because the parties agreed that § 1231 applied to Doe and that the law required supervision upon his release. The court also recognized Government interests such as reducing the risk that people subject to removal orders will abscond.

Disposition

The court granted Doe’s motion to proceed under a pseudonym but denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. It directed the clerk to enter judgment and close the case.