Salati v. Berryhill

Background

Dino J. Salati brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), which permits judicial review of a final Social Security decision. He challenged the denial of his application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits. Salati alleged disability beginning April 15, 2010, based largely on lasting physical and mental problems from a 1999 automobile accident.

The Social Security Administration denied Salati’s application in 2011. After multiple hearings, two administrative law judge decisions were vacated and remanded by the Appeals Council. Following a fourth hearing, Administrative Law Judge Kimberly Schiro issued a decision on September 21, 2017, finding that Salati was not disabled. The administrative law judge found that Salati could perform simple, routine tasks at the sedentary exertional level, with additional restrictions involving standing and walking, breaks, use of a cane, reaching and handling, hazards, and vision. Although she found that Salati could not perform his past work, she concluded that he could perform other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy, including addresser, order clerk, touch-up screener, surveillance system monitor, and call-out operator.

Salati moved for remand, asking the court to return the case to the Social Security Administration. The Commissioner moved for judgment on the pleadings, meaning a decision based on the parties’ written submissions and the administrative record.

Arguments and analysis

Salati raised three principal arguments.

Vocational-expert testimony and the Dictionary of Occupational Titles

Salati argued that the administrative law judge failed to ask the vocational expert whether her testimony conflicted with the Dictionary of Occupational Titles, a reference describing job requirements. The court noted that the administrative law judge did not ask that question. But the court held that remand was not required because Salati did not identify any apparent conflict between the vocational expert’s testimony and the Dictionary. The vocational expert identified several jobs that a person with the stated limitations could perform, and the record did not show that Salati could not perform those jobs.

Salati also relied on the Social Security Administration’s internal hearings manual. The court explained that the manual requires an administrative law judge to inquire about conflicts, but it is an internal guideline rather than a binding regulation. Because the record did not show a conflict between the vocational testimony and the Dictionary, the court held that this argument did not justify remand.

Records from Dr. Alonso

Salati argued that the administrative law judge improperly failed to assign weight to evidence from Dr. Alonso under the treating-source rule. The court rejected this argument because Dr. Alonso’s records did not contain a medical opinion as defined by the Social Security regulations. The records described Salati’s history, examination findings, and treatment, including findings of no acute distress, full range of motion, normal strength, and intact sensation. They did not express a judgment about the nature or severity of Salati’s impairments or his functional limitations. The court therefore held that the administrative law judge was not required to assign those records controlling or other specified weight under the treating-source rule.

Substantial evidence and medical opinions

Salati argued that the administrative law judge improperly gave only some weight to opinions from treating doctors Kulsakdinun and Brizer while giving greater weight to opinions from consultative examiners. The court held that the administrative law judge properly evaluated the conflicting medical evidence.

As to Dr. Kulsakdinun, the court found that the doctor’s opinions varied and were not fully supported by the doctor’s findings. The record also contained evidence that Salati had worked for years after his accident, had represented that he was ready and able to work when receiving unemployment insurance, and could perform various daily activities. The court further noted that the administrative law judge’s restrictions to simple, routine sedentary work addressed some of the limitations described by Dr. Kulsakdinun.

As to Dr. Brizer, the court found that the opinions were inconsistent with other evidence and that some limitations were stated on check-box forms without an explanation of how the doctor reached them. The court concluded that the administrative law judge could give those opinions only some weight. It also held that the administrative law judge properly relied on consultative examiners whose opinions were consistent with substantial evidence in the record.

Under the substantial-evidence standard, a court does not decide a disability claim anew. It determines whether the administrative decision used the correct legal standard and was supported by relevant evidence that a reasonable person could accept as adequate. The court emphasized that the record could support more than one view, but that the administrative law judge’s findings had to stand if supported by substantial evidence.

Ruling

Judge Gabriel W. Gorenstein denied Salati’s motion for remand and granted the Commissioner’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. The opinion did not order a remand. The court concluded that the administrative law judge’s decision was supported by substantial evidence and that none of Salati’s three arguments required sending the case back to the Social Security Administration.