Indig v. Village of Pomona

Background

Samuel Indig, Leah Indig, Meir Kahana, Robert Klein, and Naftali Klein sued the Village of Pomona, Brett Yagel, Louis Zummo, Leon Harris, and Doris Ulman. They alleged that the defendants used Village codes to target Orthodox Jewish residents and discriminated against them because of their religious affiliation. The claims invoked the United States Constitution, the Fair Housing Act, the New York Constitution, and New York Civil Rights Law § 40-c. The plaintiffs sought damages and court orders requiring changes in the defendants’ conduct.

The plaintiffs described several code-enforcement disputes. The Village issued a stop-work order concerning grading work at Samuel and Leah Indig’s home. Meir Kahana received a ticket concerning a temporary pool and a warning concerning dog waste. Robert and Naftali Klein described multiple stop-work orders and delays involving renovations to Robert Klein’s home, as well as other tickets. Robert Klein also alleged mistreatment after being elected to the Village Board of Trustees. The plaintiffs relied additionally on a New York State Division of Human Rights report and allegations of discriminatory statements and conduct by Village officials.

Motion and Preliminary Issues

The defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), which addresses subject-matter jurisdiction, and 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint adequately states a legal claim. The court did not need to consider the defendants’ alternative motion for judgment on the pleadings.

The defendants argued that Samuel Indig and Robert Klein lacked standing because they did not hold title to their residences. The court rejected that argument. It concluded that Samuel Indig adequately alleged a concrete and ongoing injury because he lived in the home and could not use its backyard, and that Robert Klein adequately alleged harm from restrictions and delays affecting his residence. The court also noted Robert Klein’s allegations concerning his position on the Village Board of Trustees.

The defendants asked the court to abstain, meaning decline to hear the case because of related state proceedings, under several doctrines. The court declined. It concluded that the pending proceeding involving Leah Indig did not challenge the alleged discriminatory pattern at issue in this case, and that the proceedings involving Meir Kahana and Naftali Klein had already been adjudicated. The court also concluded that the rule concerning damages claims based on allegedly invalid convictions did not apply because the plaintiffs were not claiming injury from unconstitutional convictions or imprisonment. Finally, the court found the state and federal proceedings were not sufficiently parallel to justify discretionary abstention.

Claims That Survived

The court held that the plaintiffs adequately pleaded an equal-protection claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. They alleged that facially neutral Village codes were enforced against Orthodox Jewish residents in a discriminatory way. The allegations included statements by Village officials, information from the Human Rights Report, delayed or limited access to municipal services, threats against officials perceived as helping Orthodox Jewish residents, and more favorable treatment of non-Orthodox Jewish residents. The court stated that the plaintiffs did not have to identify similarly situated comparators to plead this theory of intentional religious discrimination.

The Fair Housing Act claim also survived. The court held that the plaintiffs adequately alleged that Orthodox Jewish residents were not provided housing-related services or facilities on the same terms as non-Orthodox Jewish residents. It relied on the same allegations supporting the equal-protection claim.

The state equal-protection claim survived for the same reasons as the federal equal-protection claim. The court explained that New York courts use the same analysis for equal-protection challenges under the New York Constitution.

Claims Dismissed

The court dismissed the federal Free Exercise Clause claim. It concluded that the plaintiffs had not alleged that the Village codes were designed or applied to interfere with religious observation. The plaintiffs also had not alleged that the grading work, temporary pool, or home renovation involved central religious practices, or that code enforcement substantially burdened their religious beliefs.

The corresponding New York constitutional free-exercise claim was dismissed for the same reasons.

The court also dismissed the claim under New York Civil Rights Law § 40-c. It explained that the statute is a public-accommodations law requiring allegations involving denial of access to public accommodations or civil rights in that setting. The plaintiffs’ allegations concerned discrimination involving their homes and private property, and the court found no allegations showing discrimination reaching a public accommodation.

Disposition

The court granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The federal and New York equal-protection claims and the Fair Housing Act claim were allowed to proceed. The federal and New York constitutional free-exercise claims and the New York Civil Rights Law claim were dismissed. The defendants were ordered to answer the remaining claims by December 2, 2019.