Hueston v. United States
- Paul Engelmayer
- 1:16-cv-07273
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 4
In Hueston v. United States, Judge Engelmayer denied Hueston’s post-conviction petition under Section 2255 challenging his sentence because a plea waiver barred it and the claims lacked merit.
Harry Hueston, who challenged his federal sentence under Section 2255.
What happened
In Hueston v. United States, Harry Hueston challenged his 180-month sentence for conspiring to commit a Hobbs Act robbery. He did not challenge his guilty plea itself.
Hueston argued that later Supreme Court decisions, including Johnson and Davis, made the career-offender guideline used at sentencing invalid. He also raised an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim related to those arguments.
Judge Paul A. Engelmayer denied the petition. He ruled that Hueston’s plea agreement waived this type of challenge and that, even without the waiver, his arguments failed because the cited decisions did not invalidate the advisory guideline or otherwise undermine his sentence. The court closed the case and denied permission to appeal without paying the filing costs.
The detailed version
- Hueston v. United States · No. 1:16-cv-07273
- Paul Engelmayer
- Nov. 19, 2019
Background
Harry Hueston filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a procedure allowing a federal prisoner to challenge a sentence. He pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951. The court imposed a principal sentence of 180 months in prison, within the sentencing range calculated using the career-offender guideline.
Hueston did not challenge the validity of his guilty plea. Instead, he challenged his sentence based on Johnson v. United States and Davis, later Supreme Court decisions concerning unconstitutional vagueness in provisions of a federal firearms statute. He also raised an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim related to those arguments.
The Court’s Analysis
The court first held that Hueston’s plea agreement waived his challenge. The agreement stated that he would not file a direct appeal or bring a collateral challenge, including an application under federal post-conviction statutes, as long as his sentence was within or below the stipulated guideline range. Hueston did not claim that his plea was involuntary or that the court failed to follow the required plea procedures. The court therefore held that the waiver barred his petition.
The court also addressed the merits. It explained that Johnson invalidated as unconstitutionally vague the definition of “crime of violence” in a firearms statute, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). Hueston was not convicted under that statute. The court further stated that Johnson did not permit a vagueness challenge to the advisory sentencing guidelines, because those guidelines guide a judge’s discretion rather than establish a mandatory sentencing range. The court relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Beckles v. United States.
The court found Davis similarly inapplicable. Davis held that a residual clause in another firearms statute, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B), was unconstitutionally vague. In the court’s view, Davis did not undermine Beckles’s holding that the career-offender guideline could not be challenged as unconstitutionally vague.
The court added that, even if Hueston’s challenge were considered under the legal test for determining whether an offense qualifies as a crime of violence, Hobbs Act robbery conspiracy qualified under controlling authority cited by the court. The court also held that Hueston’s two New York attempted-robbery convictions independently qualified as crimes of violence under the guideline’s separate force clause.
Holding and Disposition
The court denied Hueston’s Section 2255 petition. After reviewing his other claims and the records of his plea and sentencing, the court found no defect in the proceedings and no deficiency, including no prejudicial deficiency, in his counsel’s representation.
The Clerk was directed to terminate the pending motions and close the case. The court declined to issue a certificate of appealability and certified that an appeal would not be taken in good faith. It therefore denied Hueston permission to appeal without paying the appeal’s filing costs.
Read the full 4-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.