Metropolitan Property and Casualty Company v. Colmey
- Vincent Briccetti
- 7:18-cv-09259
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 9
In Metropolitan Property v. Colmey, Judge Briccetti granted the insurer’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, ruling the policy required neither coverage nor a defense.
The ruling affects Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Company, Theresa and David Colmey, and Tonya Anthony’s claims concerning B.S.’s alleged injuries. It determines that the insurer had no duty under the policy to defend or indemnify the Colmeys in the underlying state-court action.
What happened
Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Company v. Colmey concerned the insurer’s request for a ruling that its homeowners policy did not require it to defend or pay claims against Theresa and David Colmey. Those claims arose from allegations that the Colmeys’ minor son sexually assaulted B.S.; Tonya Anthony brought the underlying state-court case for B.S. and for herself.
The court held that the policy excluded injuries resulting from the son’s intentional criminal acts. It also held that the assault was not an accident covered as an insured event. The court ruled that these conclusions applied even though the underlying case accused the Colmeys of negligently supervising their son, and that Anthony’s claims for treatment costs and emotional damages were also excluded.
Judge Vincent L. Briccetti granted the insurer’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court did not need to decide whether the policy’s separate joint-obligations provision independently barred coverage, and directed the insurer to submit a proposed judgment.
The detailed version
- Metropolitan Property and Casualty Company v. Colmey · No. 7:18-cv-09259
- Vincent Briccetti
- Nov. 20, 2019
Background
Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Company sought declaratory relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 concerning its obligations under a homeowners insurance policy issued to Theresa and David Colmey. The insurer asked the court to declare that it had no duty to defend or indemnify the Colmeys in an underlying New York state-court action brought by Tonya Anthony, individually and on behalf of B.S., a minor. The Colmeys asserted a counterclaim seeking a declaration that the insurer did have those duties. The motion for judgment on the pleadings was unopposed. The opinion states that the Colmeys were represented by counsel but did not oppose the motion, and that Anthony did not appear or file an answer or opposition.
The underlying action alleged that T.C., the Colmeys’ minor son, drugged and sexually assaulted B.S. T.C. pleaded guilty to first-degree felony sexual abuse and misdemeanor sexual misconduct. The underlying complaint asserted one claim against the Colmeys for negligent supervision and sought $1 million in damages. It alleged that B.S. suffered physical, psychological, and emotional injuries and that Anthony incurred and would continue to incur treatment costs and other expenses.
Policy and Arguments
The policy was effective from February 9, 2017, through February 9, 2018, including the date of the alleged assault. It provided personal-liability coverage for bodily injury caused by an “occurrence,” defined as an accident. The policy excluded bodily injury that was reasonably expected or intended by an insured or that resulted from an insured’s intentional and criminal acts or omissions. The policy definition of “you” and “your” included certain household family members and persons under 21 in the care of the named insureds; the court determined that T.C. was an insured under this definition.
Metropolitan argued that the intentional-act exclusion barred coverage and that T.C.’s conduct was not a covered occurrence because it was not an accident. It also argued that a joint-obligations provision made one insured’s acts binding on the other insureds. Finally, it argued that the policy excluded Anthony’s individual claims for treatment costs and expenses and any emotional damages.
Court’s Analysis
Under Rule 12(c), a party may seek judgment on the pleadings after the pleadings close and before trial. The court applied the same standard used for a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and considered whether the admitted facts clearly entitled the moving party to judgment.
Applying New York insurance law, the court compared the allegations in the underlying complaint with the policy language. It held that the intentional-act exclusion applied because the alleged injuries resulted from T.C.’s intentional criminal conduct. The court stated that the exclusion applied even if the Colmeys were negligent in supervising T.C.; the alleged negligent-supervision claim sought to hold them responsible for injuries resulting from his intentional acts.
The court separately held that sexual assault, particularly sexual assault against a minor, was not an accident and therefore did not qualify as a covered “occurrence” under the policy. As a result, T.C.’s conduct did not create an obligation to defend or indemnify the Colmeys.
The court did not reach the separate joint-obligations issue because the intentional-conduct exclusion independently resolved the coverage dispute. It also held that Anthony’s individual claim for costs and expenses related to B.S.’s treatment was derivative of B.S.’s injuries and therefore excluded. To the extent Anthony sought emotional damages, the court held those damages were excluded because the policy required a claimant to have first experienced direct physical harm.
Disposition
Judge Vincent L. Briccetti granted the motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court ruled that Metropolitan had no obligation under the policy to defend or indemnify the Colmeys in the underlying action and that the policy excluded coverage for Anthony’s individual claim. The court directed Metropolitan to submit a proposed judgment by December 4, 2019, and instructed the Clerk to terminate the motion.
Read the full 9-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.