Figueroa v. United States

Background

A jury convicted Luis Figueroa in 2014 on three counts involving drug trafficking and unlawful firearm possession. The court later sentenced him to 180 months in prison followed by five years of supervised release. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the convictions on direct appeal.

Proceeding without a lawyer, Figueroa filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which allows a federal prisoner to seek correction of a conviction or sentence for specified legal or constitutional errors. He later sought to amend that motion based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Carpenter v. United States concerning warrants for cell-site location information.

Claims and analysis

Figueroa raised six grounds in his § 2255 motion. Three challenged trial rulings: admission of part of an agent’s testimony about a conversation with the superintendent of the apartment building, denial of a request to suppress an in-court identification, and denial of motions to suppress historical cell-site location data.

The court held that the identification claim was procedurally barred because Figueroa had not raised it on direct appeal and gave no reason for that omission. The court held that the cell-site claims could not be relitigated because they had been raised and rejected on direct appeal. As to the agent’s testimony, the court considered Figueroa’s argument that ineffective assistance excused the default but concluded, for the reasons discussed in its ineffective-assistance analysis, that he could not satisfy that standard.

The other three grounds alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. First, Figueroa argued that counsel should have retained an expert on eyewitness identification. The court rejected the claim because the underlying request for identification-expert testimony had already been rejected on direct appeal, and pursuing a meritless argument would not establish deficient performance or prejudice.

Second, Figueroa argued that counsel should have objected to the agent’s testimony about what the apartment superintendent said. The court agreed with the Government that the statement was not offered to prove that Figueroa lived in the apartment, but instead to explain the agent’s state of mind and investigative steps. The court further held that, even assuming the statement was hearsay and testimonial, any Confrontation Clause violation was harmless because video surveillance and GPS evidence independently supported the conclusion that Figueroa lived there. Figueroa therefore could not show that counsel’s performance was deficient or that the alleged error affected the result.

Third, Figueroa argued that counsel should have pursued additional questioning of a witness at a hearing concerning the identification procedure and should have called another agent at that hearing. The court found that counsel had extensively cross-examined the witness, that decisions about the extent of cross-examination and which witnesses to call are generally strategic, and that counsel later cross-examined the other agent at trial. Figueroa did not overcome the presumption that these were reasonable tactical decisions.

Motion to amend

Figueroa argued that Carpenter required suppression of the cell-site records and a new trial because the Government had obtained warrants under the Stored Communications Act, which did not require probable cause. The court denied the motion to amend. It held that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied because, when the warrants were obtained, Second Circuit law did not require a warrant for those cell records. The court also noted that, even without the good-faith exception, the warrants were supported by probable cause.

Disposition

Judge Andrew L. Carter, Jr. denied Figueroa’s § 2255 motion and denied his motion to amend the petition. The court declined to issue a certificate of appealability, finding no substantial showing that a constitutional right had been denied, and directed the Clerk of Court to close the case.