Pustilnik v. Battery Park City Authority

Background

Alix Pustilnik sued her former employer, Battery Park City Authority (BPCA), and BPCA President B.J. Jones. She alleged that BPCA terminated her employment as General Counsel on February 21, 2018, because of her age, disabilities, and caregiver responsibilities. Her claims arose under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL).

Pustilnik alleged that she was 51 when terminated, had previously performed well, and was replaced by Abigail Goldenberg, whom she identified as approximately 44 years old. She also alleged that Jones had hired or promoted several younger employees. Pustilnik described her psoriatic arthritis and depression and alleged that BPCA officials knew about those conditions. She further alleged that officials knew about her responsibilities caring for her parents after her father became seriously ill and died.

BPCA and Jones moved to dismiss the amended complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint alleges enough facts to state a legally plausible claim. The court treated the complaint’s factual allegations as true for purposes of deciding the motion but did not accept unsupported legal conclusions.

Age-discrimination claim

The court held that Pustilnik did not plausibly allege that her age was the “but-for” cause of her termination—that is, that she would not have been fired if she were not her age. The court noted that being replaced by a younger worker, without more, generally does not establish discriminatory intent. Goldenberg was approximately seven years younger than Pustilnik but was also over 40 and therefore in the same age-protected group under the ADEA. The court also found no allegation that Jones or Dennis Mehiel knew Goldenberg’s age or acted because of the age difference.

The court further found that Pustilnik’s allegations that BPCA’s cost-cutting explanation was false were conclusory. Her assertions about how BPCA should have reduced costs, including retaining her or asking her to accept a pay cut, did not provide facts showing that the stated reason was a pretext, meaning a cover for discrimination. Her allegations that Jones favored younger employees also lacked details about the employees’ hiring or promotion circumstances, qualifications, or whether they were comparable to Pustilnik in relevant respects. The court therefore granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the ADEA claim.

Disability-discrimination claim

The court held that Pustilnik did not plausibly allege that BPCA terminated her because of her arthritis, depression, or a perceived disability. BPCA did not dispute, for purposes of the motion, that it was covered by the ADA, that Pustilnik was disabled under that law, or that she was qualified to perform her job. The court found, however, that the complaint did not connect either disability to the termination decision.

The court noted that Pustilnik did not allege that Jones, Mehiel, or another BPCA decision-maker made comments about her disabilities, failed to accommodate them, showed hostility toward her because of them, or otherwise indicated that they played a role in the decision. The court also held that her allegation that she was replaced by someone without disabilities was not enough by itself to support an inference of discrimination. It therefore granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the ADA claim.

NYCHRL claims and disposition

Pustilnik also asserted NYCHRL claims based on age, disability, and caregiver status against BPCA and Jones. After dismissing the federal claims, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, meaning authority to decide related state or local claims in the same case. The court did so without prejudice. The opinion stated that Pustilnik could file those claims in state court.

Result

The court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the ADEA and ADA claims, declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the NYCHRL claims without prejudice, directed the Clerk of Court to terminate the pending motion, and closed the case.