Harraz v. EgyptAir Airlines Company

Background

Iman Harraz sued EgyptAir Airlines Company, Virgin Atlantic Airways Limited, Gamal Maher Emom Aly, Paul John Weston, and the Port Authority of New York & New Jersey. She alleged that she was injured on November 27, 2017, when the wingtip of the EgyptAir aircraft on which she was traveling collided with the wingtip of a taxiing Virgin Atlantic aircraft at John F. Kennedy International Airport. She sought damages for alleged physical injuries, mental anguish, and reduced ability to perform her regular vocation.

Harraz filed the action in New York state court on November 27, 2018. EgyptAir removed it to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York on December 12, 2018, invoking ordinary federal-question jurisdiction, supplemental jurisdiction over related state claims, and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act’s removal provision. Harraz moved to remand, meaning she asked the federal court to return the case to state court.

Removal and consent

The court first considered whether removal was procedurally defective because defendants other than EgyptAir had not formally joined the notice of removal. The court held that the consent requirement did not apply because EgyptAir relied in part on the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, which permits removal of an action involving a foreign state or its agency or instrumentality. The court stated that EgyptAir, which the notice described as a state-owned entity, had an absolute right under that provision to remove the action in its entirety, absent a valid and explicit waiver.

The court also held that the pilots’ consent was not required because they had not been properly served when the case was removed. Harraz attempted to serve Aly by leaving documents with an unnamed employee at EgyptAir’s Manhattan office and mailing documents there. The court found that this was not Aly’s actual place of business under New York law because the evidence showed that EgyptAir pilots were based in Cairo, rarely visited the Manhattan office, and did not conduct work there. The office also lacked authority to accept service for EgyptAir employees.

Harraz attempted to serve Weston by giving documents to Christopher Carlsen, who was authorized to accept service for Virgin Atlantic but not for Weston. Because Carlsen was not authorized to accept service for Weston and did not represent him, the court found that Weston also had not been properly served. The court noted that Harraz could still try to complete service on the pilots after removal under the applicable federal procedures.

As to Virgin Atlantic and the Port Authority, the court found that their conduct clearly showed consent to removal. Both were represented by the same lawyers who filed EgyptAir’s notice, and both filed answers in federal court within about a week after removal. The court held that those answers independently and unambiguously manifested their willingness to continue litigating in federal court. It alternatively held that any consent-related defect had been cured by the defendants’ joint opposition to the remand motion.

Federal jurisdiction

The court identified several jurisdictional bases. First, it held that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act gave it jurisdiction over all claims against EgyptAir because EgyptAir was a state-owned entity and therefore an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state under the statute.

Second, the court held that it had original federal-question jurisdiction over Harraz’s claims against EgyptAir and Virgin Atlantic under the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air, commonly called the Montreal Convention. The complaint expressly raised claims under that treaty against both airlines.

Third, the court held that it had supplemental jurisdiction over the related state-law tort claims against Virgin Atlantic and the Port Authority. Supplemental jurisdiction allows a federal court to hear state-law claims arising from the same underlying facts as claims within the court’s original jurisdiction. Here, all of Harraz’s claims arose from the same aircraft collision at John F. Kennedy International Airport. The court also stated that, if Harraz properly served the pilots, it would have supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law tort claims against them.

Harraz argued that the state-law claims predominated because the case was a simple negligence action involving one injured plaintiff. The court rejected that argument, finding that the state-law claims were not more complex, important, or burdensome than the Montreal Convention claims. It also noted that the Montreal Convention barred, at least, Harraz’s state-law tort claims against EgyptAir. The court therefore concluded that it was required to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the related state-law claims.

Disposition

Judge Edgardo Ramos denied Harraz’s motion to remand. The action was to proceed in federal court, and the parties were directed to appear for a status conference on January 17, 2020. The opinion did not resolve liability or damages for the alleged injuries.