Scotto v. City of New York and Erica Caraway

Background

Mariano Scotto, a New York City Department of Transportation employee, alleged that the City and individual defendants discriminated against him because they perceived a mental-health condition as making him unable to perform his job. The alleged conduct followed workplace complaints about his singing, an encounter with supervisors, and an investigation by Erica Caraway. Caraway’s report, called Attachment A, recommended a medical fitness examination and stated that Scotto had engaged in disruptive conduct, driven recklessly, and made certain admissions. Scotto alleged that several of those statements were false.

A consulting psychiatrist found Scotto unfit for duty. Scotto challenged that determination in an administrative proceeding. Administrative Law Judge Joycelyn McGeachy-Kuls later found that Scotto was fit to perform his duties and recommended that he be returned to all duties and responsibilities of his position. The Department of Transportation accepted that recommendation and found Scotto fit for duty, but Scotto alleged that the City continued to restrict his use of a City vehicle, overtime work, and some job duties.

Scotto’s amended complaint asserted claims under the New York Constitution, New York Civil Service Law § 72, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the New York State Human Rights Law, the New York City Human Rights Law, and New York common law. The defendants moved to dismiss the entire amended complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), which address subject-matter jurisdiction and whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim.

Rulings

The court granted the motion as to all claims against Trottenberg and Caraway in their official capacities, ruling that those claims duplicated the claims against the City.

For the First Cause of Action, the court granted the motion and dismissed the state due-process claims. To the extent Scotto challenged the defendants’ failure to follow the Civil Service Law and the administrative determination, the court said he could pursue an Article 78 special proceeding in state court; the dismissal was without prejudice to that proceeding. The court also held that Scotto had not stated a viable due-process claim based on allegedly false information used in the administrative proceeding.

For the Second Cause of Action, the court denied the motion as to Scotto’s Americans with Disabilities Act discrimination claim against the City. The court concluded that the allegations plausibly connected the City’s restrictions on his vehicle use and overtime to a perception that his mental-health condition made him unfit for work. The court granted the motion as to the Americans with Disabilities Act claim against Caraway individually and as to the New York State Human Rights Law discrimination claim. The New York State and New York City discrimination claims were also dismissed because Scotto had previously pursued those discrimination claims before the state human-rights agency, triggering statutory election-of-remedies bars.

For the Third and Fourth Causes of Action, the court denied the motion as to Scotto’s retaliation claims against the City under the New York City Human Rights Law and the New York State Human Rights Law. The court held that the allegations plausibly supported a connection between Scotto’s protected complaints and the City’s continued failure to restore his duties and employment benefits after he was found fit for duty. The court granted the motion as to the retaliation claims against Caraway individually and as to the discrimination claims under those laws.

For the Fifth Cause of Action, the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, the court granted the motion to the extent the claim relied on statements made during the state human-rights, federal equal-employment, and administrative fitness proceedings. Those statements were protected by an absolute privilege for statements made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings. The court denied the motion as to the claim based on statements in Attachment A, finding that the allegations could support a finding that Caraway made materially false statements with reckless disregard for the resulting emotional distress and that an issue remained about whether qualified privilege was defeated by malice.

For the Sixth Cause of Action, the negligent infliction of emotional distress claim, the court granted the motion. Scotto did not allege that he faced physical harm, witnessed death or serious injury to an immediate family member, or suffered an emotional injury from a breach of a duty specifically related to physical safety.

For the Seventh Cause of Action, the defamation claim, the court granted the motion to the extent the claim relied on statements made during the state human-rights and federal equal-employment proceedings, because those statements were absolutely privileged. The court denied the motion as to statements in Attachment A. It held that Scotto plausibly alleged false statements, publication to the consulting psychiatrist, malice or reckless disregard for the truth, and harm to his professional reputation and income. The court also stated that allegations attributing mental illness in an employment context could support defamation per se.

Disposition and effect

The motion to dismiss was granted in part and denied in part. The surviving claims were Scotto’s disability-discrimination claim against the City under the Americans with Disabilities Act; his retaliation claims against the City under the New York State and New York City Human Rights Laws; and his intentional emotional-distress and defamation claims against the City and Caraway based on Attachment A. The case was referred to a magistrate judge for general pretrial management.