Taylor v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority

Background

Curtaysia Taylor moved for judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b) and for a new trial under Rule 59(a). A motion for judgment as a matter of law asks the court to enter a different judgment because the evidence was legally insufficient to support the jury’s verdict. A motion for a new trial asks the court to order another trial because the verdict was seriously erroneous or against the weight of the evidence.

After approximately two hours of deliberation on September 12, 2019, the jury returned a verdict for the defendants. The jury did not decide the substance of Taylor’s hostile-work-environment and retaliatory-discharge claims. Instead, it found that Taylor had not established a joint-employer relationship between the New York City Transit Authority and Rotator Staffing, the temporary staffing agency that placed Taylor at Transit. Under the instructions, without a joint-employer finding, Transit could not be held liable.

Jury instructions and Taylor’s arguments

The court had instructed the jury that the joint-employer question was functional and depended on whether Transit and Rotator Staffing shared control over matters such as hiring, firing, discipline, pay, insurance benefits, employment records, and supervision. During deliberations, the jury asked whether all, most, some, or only one of those conditions had to be satisfied.

After consulting with counsel, the court told the jury that there was no precise test and that the listed matters were factors the jury could consider. The court also explained that a joint-employer relationship could exist if there was sufficient evidence that Transit had immediate control over the other company’s employees. Taylor’s counsel stated that he had no objection to the proposed response, and the jury asked no further questions.

Taylor argued that the court should grant judgment in her favor or order a new trial because: (1) the evidence overwhelmingly showed that Transit and Rotator Staffing were joint employers; (2) the joint-employer test was incorrectly stated; (3) the court did not directly answer the jury’s question; and (4) the instructions confused the joint-employer test with whether Ashraf, a Transit employee, was Taylor’s supervisor.

Court’s reasoning

The court rejected each argument. It found that the evidence of a joint-employer relationship was weak, pointing to unrebutted testimony from Stephen Rogers, Transit’s Deputy Chief of Consultant Servicers, that Transit was not Taylor’s employer.

The court also held that the final joint-employer instruction tracked the parties’ joint proposed instruction almost verbatim. Taylor’s counsel had not objected after the instruction was given or to the court’s response to the jury’s question. The court found no indication that the jury was confused, emphasizing that the instructions explained when a party had to prove every element and separately stated that the joint-employer factors were factors the jury could consider, not mandatory requirements.

Finally, the court rejected Taylor’s argument concerning Ashraf. The joint-employer instruction did not refer to Ashraf, supervisor status, or the separate test concerning tangible employment actions. Although the words “hiring” and “firing” appeared in both instructions, the court said they appeared in different contexts: the joint-employer inquiry concerned whether Transit and Rotator Staffing shared control, while the supervisor inquiry concerned whether Transit gave Ashraf authority to take tangible employment actions.

Disposition

Judge William H. Pauley III concluded that Taylor had not shown that the verdict was seriously erroneous or a miscarriage of justice, and therefore had not met the lower standard for a new trial, much less the higher standard for judgment as a matter of law. The court denied Taylor’s motion for judgment as a matter of law and denied her motion for a new trial. The Clerk of Court was directed to terminate the motion at ECF No. 121.