Frye v. Lagerstrom

Background

The case concerns an agreement for producing the short film Homeless: A Love Story (HALS). Under the agreement, Benjamin F. Lagerstrom and Dianacollv, Inc. were to provide video-production services, including equipment, cast, and crew. Joseph Frye was to provide, among other things, meals, a makeup artist, and participation credit for the crew. The agreement stated that all footage and material covered by the agreement belonged to Frye and limited Dianacollv’s use of the footage.

The film was shot in late September 2014. On October 12, 2014, Lagerstrom, using an alias, published a YouTube video composed entirely of footage from the filming. Frye later completed editing the footage and obtained copyright registrations for the film’s script and motion picture. Lagerstrom subsequently published four more online videos incorporating HALS footage. Frye sued, asserting copyright-infringement and breach-of-contract claims.

Earlier Proceedings and Renewed Motion

In 2017, the court granted Frye’s motion for summary judgment. Lagerstrom appealed. The Second Circuit vacated that ruling because Lagerstrom had not been properly advised that he needed to submit counter-affidavits or other documentary evidence addressing each genuine dispute of material fact that he wanted to preserve for trial.

After the case returned to the district court, the court directed Frye to refile his summary-judgment motion and provided Lagerstrom with a notice explaining the requirements for a self-represented party opposing summary judgment. The court also provided the relevant federal and local rules.

Lagerstrom again did not submit a response to Frye’s statement of material facts. The court therefore treated Frye’s supported factual assertions as uncontested for purposes of the motion. It nevertheless read Lagerstrom’s submissions generously and considered the strongest arguments they reasonably suggested.

Arguments Addressed

The court rejected Lagerstrom’s apparent argument that he entered the agreement believing Frye was acting as an agent of CBS/Showtime. The materials Lagerstrom cited suggested only that Frye was associated with CBS/Showtime, a fact Frye did not dispute. Lagerstrom also made allegations that Frye had misrepresented facts about the HALS project before the agreement was signed, but he offered no supporting evidence.

The court also rejected Lagerstrom’s argument that Frye could not assert copyright rights in HALS because producing the film violated a CBS business-conduct statement. The court said the cited provisions required disclosure of certain activities rather than forbidding them. Frye stated that he disclosed the project to Showtime twice before signing the agreement, and Lagerstrom offered no evidence supporting his assertion that Frye’s affidavit was false.

Lagerstrom asked the court to revoke Frye’s HALS copyright registration under 17 U.S.C. § 411(b)(2). The court said it was unaware of authority allowing a federal district court to cancel a copyright registration. It further explained that Section 411(b)(2) provides a process for obtaining advice from the Copyright Office when a registration application allegedly contains inaccurate information; it does not itself authorize the cancellation Lagerstrom sought. The court found that Lagerstrom did not show that Frye’s application contained inaccurate information or that Frye knowingly included an inaccuracy. The court therefore declined to seek advice from the Copyright Office.

Finally, Lagerstrom argued that his use of HALS footage was protected by the First Amendment because he intended to inform the public about alleged plagiarism by Frye. The court rejected that argument, finding that the uncontested facts showed Lagerstrom used the footage in separately titled videos and that he identified no evidence showing those videos discussed Frye’s alleged plagiarism or plagiarism generally.

Ruling

Judge Naomi Reice Buchwald granted Frye’s renewed motion for summary judgment on the copyright-infringement and breach-of-contract claims against Lagerstrom and Dianacollv. The court relied on its reasoning in the earlier memorandum and order as well as the analysis in this order. Because the court had already addressed the appropriate relief, it stated that an identical judgment should again be entered by the Clerk, after which the case should be closed. The opinion does not state that the renewed judgment had already been entered when the order was issued.