Jones v. The City of New York

Background

Erin Jones, proceeding without a lawyer, was employed by the New York City Police Department as a secretary from 2008 to 2015. She alleged that the City violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law because of her cardiac and respiratory disabilities. Her claims alleged failure to provide reasonable accommodations, disability discrimination, and retaliation.

In September 2014, Jones requested daytime work hours and an exemption from mandatory weekend overtime. The City denied that request on October 6, 2014, stating that it lacked sufficient medical support and requested documentation. Jones later took various leaves of absence. After she did not return to work following more than one year of leave, the NYPD terminated her employment on May 3, 2017, under section 73 of the New York Civil Service Law.

In September 2016, Jones requested daytime work and a new location closer to her home. The City asserted that it temporarily approved the request in December 2016 by transferring her closer to home, assigning her to a morning shift, and removing mandatory overtime through January 31, 2017. Jones disputed receiving notice of that decision. The City later closed her accommodation file for failure to provide required medical documentation.

Summary-judgment standard

The City moved for summary judgment on all claims. Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute about a material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court viewed the facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Jones, the party opposing the motion.

Timeliness of the ADA claims

The court held that ADA employment-discrimination claims generally required Jones to file an administrative charge within 300 days of the alleged unlawful practice. Jones filed her first Equal Employment Opportunity Commission charge on December 26, 2016. The court therefore treated claims based on events before March 1, 2016—including the 2014 accommodation denial and 2014 suspensions—as time-barred and granted summary judgment to the City on those claims.

The court rejected applying the continuing-violation doctrine. It found that the 2014 and 2016 accommodation requests occurred at different times and under different circumstances and were not shown to be part of a common discriminatory policy.

2016 ADA accommodation claim

The court denied summary judgment on Jones’s timely claim that the City failed to provide a reasonable accommodation in 2016. Under the ADA, an employer generally must provide a reasonable accommodation for a known disability unless doing so would create an undue hardship. The court identified factual disputes about whether Jones could perform the essential functions of her secretarial job with an accommodation and whether the City provided a reasonable accommodation.

The court noted that Jones’s requested daytime schedule and location closer to home appeared reasonable and potentially available. Her personal physician and the NYPD’s Deputy Chief Surgeon had both found that she could perform her secretarial duties. The City’s assertion that Jones could not perform those duties was also disputed by evidence that the City temporarily approved a closer assignment, a morning tour, and no mandatory overtime. Because Jones disputed receiving notice of that approval, the court found a factual dispute about whether the City had actually provided the accommodation.

Disability-discrimination claims

The court granted the City’s motion for summary judgment on Jones’s disability-discrimination claims under the New York State and New York City Human Rights Laws. The court found that Jones had evidence supporting several elements of a basic discrimination claim, including that she was disabled, qualified to perform her job, and suffered an adverse employment action when she was fired. But the court found insufficient evidence that the termination occurred because of her disability.

The City presented a nondiscriminatory reason for the termination: Jones had been absent and unable to perform her position for more than one year, and the NYPD terminated her under section 73 of the Civil Service Law. The court held that Jones had not presented enough evidence for a reasonable factfinder to determine that this stated reason was a pretext for disability discrimination.

Retaliation claims

The court granted the City’s motion for summary judgment on Jones’s retaliation claims under the ADA, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law. The court recognized that requesting an accommodation and filing an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission charge are protected activities, and that Jones experienced adverse actions. But it found insufficient evidence that a retaliatory motive contributed to the termination or the handling of her accommodation requests.

Jones filed her Equal Employment Opportunity Commission charge on December 26, 2016, and the City terminated her employment about five months later. The court found that this timing, together with the termination under section 73, did not establish retaliation. The court also found no evidence that any miscommunication about the temporary accommodation or the later closure of Jones’s accommodation file resulted from retaliatory intent.

Disposition

Judge Analisa Torres granted in part and denied in part the City’s motion for summary judgment. The court denied the motion as to Jones’s 2016 ADA reasonable-accommodation claim, except that it dismissed as time-barred accommodation claims accruing before March 1, 2016. It granted the motion on Jones’s disability-discrimination claims and retaliation claims. The order stated that trial would commence on June 22, 2020, and directed Jones to file a pretrial statement within 30 days after receiving the order.