Bermudez v. Bon Secours Charity Health System, Inc.

Background

Sonny Bermudez sued Bon Secours Charity Health System, Inc. (BSCHS) and Theresa Krell under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the New York State Human Rights Law. Bermudez alleged that Krell, his supervisor, made sexual advances and unwanted physical contact in June 2017. He also alleged that, after he ignored those advances, Krell and BSCHS subjected him to hostile treatment at work, including yelling, profanity, workplace accusations, changes to his office, unreasonable work requests, exclusion from a meeting, and a failure to respond adequately to his complaints.

Bermudez further alleged that he was suspended without pay in August 2018 and terminated in September 2018 after being accused of sending confidential pricing information to his private email account. He claimed that he had complained to management about Krell’s conduct. His complaint asserted: (1) gender-based discrimination under Title VII against BSCHS and Krell; (2) gender-based discrimination under the New York law against both defendants; (3) aiding and abetting discrimination under the New York law against Krell; and (4) retaliation under the New York law against both defendants.

Rule 12(b)(6) Standard

The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). At this stage, the court had to accept the complaint’s factual allegations as true and draw reasonable inferences in Bermudez’s favor. The complaint had to contain enough factual matter to make the claims plausible, rather than merely possible.

Title VII Claim Against Krell

The court dismissed the Title VII discrimination claim against Krell. Title VII does not impose individual liability on supervisors, so Count I could not proceed against her. The same Title VII claim survived against BSCHS, subject to Bermudez correcting deficiencies concerning dates.

Title VII Hostile-Work-Environment Claim Against BSCHS

The court treated the complaint as asserting a hostile-work-environment theory of sexual harassment. The defendants argued that the June 2017 touching incidents were outside Title VII’s 300-day administrative filing period. Bermudez argued that those incidents were part of a continuing violation that also included later conduct within the limitations period.

The court declined to rule at the motion-to-dismiss stage that the earlier incidents were unrelated to the later alleged harassment. It also declined to decide that the alleged conduct was not sufficiently severe or pervasive to support a hostile-work-environment claim. The court therefore denied the motion as to this claim, while allowing Bermudez to amend to provide missing dates, including the dates of Krell’s alleged comments and his Equal Employment Opportunity Commission complaint.

Retaliation

The court concluded that Bermudez adequately alleged protected activity because he claimed that he complained to a BSCHS corporate officer about Krell’s alleged discrimination. The complaint also alleged materially adverse actions—an unpaid suspension and termination.

The court nevertheless found the retaliation allegations deficient because Bermudez alleged that the suspension and termination resulted from the hostile work environment, rather than alleging that defendants took those actions because he had complained. The complaint did not allege that the decisionmakers knew about his complaint or provide direct or circumstantial evidence connecting the complaint to the adverse actions. The court stated that the retaliation claim must be dismissed but gave Bermudez leave to amend.

New York State Claims

The court stated that the standards for hostile-work-environment and retaliation claims under the New York State Human Rights Law are the same as the standards under Title VII, but that the New York law has a three-year limitations period. Because Bermudez had sufficiently alleged underlying violations of the New York law, the court did not dismiss his aiding-and-abetting claim against Krell. The court also continued to exercise supplemental jurisdiction—authority to hear related state-law claims—over the state claims against BSCHS and Krell because the federal claim against BSCHS had not been dismissed.

Damages and Disposition

The defendants argued, and Bermudez acknowledged, that punitive damages and attorney fees are not available under the New York law. The court stated that those remedies are available under Title VII and declined at that stage to strike Bermudez’s requests for punitive damages, attorney fees, or compensatory damages for emotional distress.

Judge Alvin K. Hellerstein granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motion to dismiss. Bermudez could file an amended complaint within 10 days. The court also directed the parties to exchange files and appear for a conference concerning depositions.