Abdulazeez v. Ean Holdings L.L.C.

Background

Mohamed Imran Abdulazeez sued Hermann E. Depazarce for personal injuries allegedly caused by a three-car collision on October 30, 2016, on the Cross County Parkway. Depazarce was driving the vehicle that struck the rear of Abdulazeez’s vehicle. Abdulazeez claimed injuries to his cervical spine, lumbar spine, and right wrist. He later underwent cervical spine surgery on July 11, 2017.

The case was initially filed in New York state court against EAN Holdings, LLC, Enterprise Rent-A-Car, and Depazarce. EAN Holdings and Enterprise were later dismissed under a voluntary stipulation. After discovery ended, Depazarce moved for summary judgment, asking the court to rule that the accident did not proximately cause Abdulazeez’s cervical injuries and that the claimed injuries did not qualify as “serious injuries” under New York’s No-Fault Insurance Law.

Legal standards

Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence shows no genuine dispute about a fact that could affect the result and the moving party is entitled to judgment under the law. At this stage, the court must view disputed evidence and reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion.

Under New York Insurance Law § 5102(d), a person generally may pursue liability damages beyond the No-Fault Law’s threshold only if the person suffered a qualifying “serious injury.” The categories relevant here were a permanent consequential limitation, a significant limitation of use, and an injury that prevented the person from performing substantially all usual daily activities for at least 90 of the 180 days after the accident, known as the “90/180 category.”

Causation

Depazarce argued that Abdulazeez’s cervical disc herniation could not have been caused by the accident because a December 19, 2016 magnetic-resonance imaging scan did not show a disc herniation, while a March 12, 2017 scan did. Depazarce relied on the December scan, testimony from Abdulazeez’s treating surgeon, and an expert radiologist’s opinion that the later findings reflected degeneration or new findings unrelated to the accident.

Abdulazeez submitted contrary evidence from his treating surgeon, Dante Leven, and treating chiropractor, Peter Zilahy. Leven stated that the December scan was difficult to evaluate because of its poor quality, that the March scan showed a C4/5 disc herniation requiring surgery, and that the herniation was causally related to the accident. Leven also stated that the degeneration identified by the defense expert did not cause the herniation. Zilahy opined that Abdulazeez’s spinal and wrist injuries were caused by the collision.

The court held that this evidence created genuine factual disputes about the reliability of the December scan and whether the accident or degeneration caused the disc herniation. It therefore denied summary judgment on proximate cause, meaning the required connection between the accident and the claimed injury.

Serious injury

Depazarce argued that Abdulazeez had not shown a serious injury even if the accident caused his cervical injuries. The court concluded that Abdulazeez had submitted objective evidence—measured restrictions in his cervical range of motion—from examinations by Zilahy and Leven. Viewing that evidence in Abdulazeez’s favor, the court found a triable factual issue concerning whether he suffered a permanent consequential limitation or significant limitation of use. The court therefore denied summary judgment on both of those serious-injury categories and did not need to decide whether the lumbar and wrist injuries independently qualified.

The court reached a different result for the 90/180 category. Abdulazeez testified that he missed only one full week of work at the mobile store immediately after the accident and continued working as a Lyft driver for approximately 10 to 12 hours per week. Even accepting his account that he later missed additional work, the court found that he had not shown that he was unable to perform substantially all of his daily activities for at least 90 of the 180 days after the accident. The court therefore granted summary judgment on that claim.

Disposition

Judge Naomi Reice Buchwald denied Depazarce’s motion for summary judgment with respect to proximate causation and Abdulazeez’s claims under the permanent-consequential-limitation and significant-limitation categories. The judge granted the motion with respect to Abdulazeez’s claim under the 90/180 category. The court directed counsel to appear for a later conference and directed the clerk to terminate all pending motions.