Sullivan, Jr. v. Doctor's Associates LLC

Background

Phillip Sullivan, Jr. alleged that he is profoundly deaf and communicates fluently in American Sign Language. He claimed that, while trying to order a steak sandwich at a Subway restaurant, an employee became impatient and angry, used aggressive gestures, flattened a sandwich on the counter, and did not process his order. Sullivan alleged that the restaurant failed to provide him the same service provided to hearing customers.

The restaurant was allegedly operated by Geeta Fastfood Enterprise Inc., and Abhimanue Manchanda was alleged to own it. Doctor’s Associates LLC was identified as Subway’s franchisor. Sullivan alleged that Doctor’s Associates controlled franchise operations through standardized franchise agreements, an operating system, an operations manual, mandatory training, policies, equipment requirements, and other provisions. He also alleged that the restaurant lacked technologies intended to improve access for people with hearing impairments.

Sullivan asserted claims under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, New York state law, the New York City Human Rights Law, and for declaratory relief. He also sought class-wide relief. Doctor’s Associates moved to dismiss the claims against it under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which allows dismissal when a complaint does not adequately state a legally sufficient claim.

Court’s Analysis

Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act prohibits disability discrimination by a person who owns, leases, or operates a public accommodation. The court followed Second Circuit precedent requiring Sullivan to plausibly allege that Doctor’s Associates owned, leased, or operated the restaurant.

Sullivan did not allege that Doctor’s Associates owned the restaurant. The court also found that the complaint did not adequately allege that Doctor’s Associates leased it, because the franchise agreement referred to a lease by Doctor’s Associates or an affiliate, without alleging that Doctor’s Associates itself was the lessor.

The court adopted a definition of “operates” that asks whether the franchisor puts or keeps the business in operation, controls or directs its functioning, or conducts or manages its affairs. For a franchisor to be an operator under Title III, the court said, the franchisor must specifically control the franchise’s accessibility for people with disabilities. General supervisory authority is not enough.

The court found that Sullivan’s allegations about the operations manual, mandatory training, company policies, franchise termination authority, restaurant design, equipment, point-of-sale system, and general operations described general supervision rather than specific control over accessibility. The point-of-sale provisions concerned communications between the franchisee and Doctor’s Associates, while Sullivan’s allegations concerned communications between restaurant employees and customers. The court therefore concluded that Sullivan had not plausibly alleged that Doctor’s Associates operated the restaurant for purposes of Title III.

The court dismissed the New York state-law claims because Sullivan treated them as coextensive with his federal disability claims. It also dismissed the New York City Human Rights Law claims. Although those city-law claims generally must be analyzed separately and more broadly than federal and state claims, the court found no relevant difference in the legal analysis for the issue presented here, and Sullivan had argued that the claims were similar to his ADA claims.

The court did not consider sworn statements attached to Sullivan’s opposition papers because they were not attached to, incorporated into, or integral to the amended complaint.

Disposition

Judge Gregory H. Woods granted Doctor’s Associates LLC’s motion to dismiss. The court dismissed Sullivan’s claims against Doctor’s Associates, granted Sullivan leave to replead all of his claims, and directed that any amended complaint be filed no later than 14 days after the order. The opinion does not state that the claims against the other defendants were dismissed by this order.