Pratt v. Brennan
- Philip Halpern
- 7:18-cv-04799
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 17
In Pratt v. Brennan, Judge Karas granted defendants’ motion, dismissing some claims and a defendant while leaving Title VII claims.
Lorianne Pratt’s hostile-work-environment claim and Count Four were dismissed with prejudice, and Jerry Shapiro was dismissed from the case. Pratt’s Title VII race- and sex-discrimination and retaliation claims remained against Megan J. Brennan.
What happened
In Pratt v. Brennan, Lorianne Pratt alleged that Postal Service employees discriminated against her because of race and sex and retaliated after she complained. She said she was repeatedly denied higher-level positions and experienced a hostile work environment.
The defendants asked the court to dismiss the hostile-work-environment claim and the claims brought under Section 1983. The court ruled that the alleged job denials were separate employment decisions, not the repeated and severe harassment required for a hostile-work-environment claim. It also ruled that Section 1983 does not apply to federal employees and that the same allegations could not proceed under a court-created damages remedy because Title VII provides a remedy for federal employment discrimination.
Judge Karas granted the motion. The hostile-work-environment claim and Count Four were dismissed with prejudice, and Jerry Shapiro was dismissed from the case entirely. Lorianne Pratt’s Title VII claims for race- and sex-based discrimination and retaliation remained against Megan J. Brennan, the Postmaster General.
The detailed version
- Pratt v. Brennan · No. 7:18-cv-04799
- Philip Halpern
- Jan. 22, 2020
Background
Lorianne Pratt sued Megan J. Brennan, sued as the Postmaster General, and Jerry Shapiro. Pratt alleged that Postal Service employees discriminated against her because of race and sex, retaliated against her for making discrimination complaints, and violated her rights under the Fourteenth Amendment through 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The alleged discrimination centered on denials of supervisory and other higher-level positions for which Pratt claimed she was qualified. She also alleged that she experienced a hostile work environment after filing complaints with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
The opinion states that Pratt was represented by counsel. Before this motion, she had voluntarily dismissed a negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim and a § 1983 claim against another defendant, Richard Conte. The remaining motion was filed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim.
Hostile-Work-Environment Claim
The court held that Pratt did not plausibly allege a Title VII hostile-work-environment claim. Such a claim requires allegations showing harassment that was objectively severe or pervasive, that Pratt personally viewed as hostile or abusive, and that occurred because of a protected characteristic such as race or sex.
The amended complaint stated, in conclusory terms, that Pratt experienced a hostile work environment but did not identify specific race- or sex-based harassment. The court also found that Shapiro’s alleged statements about taking a position in Maybrook and his informal tone did not, as pleaded, constitute insults based on race, sex, or age. Pratt’s repeated denials of promotions were discrete employment decisions. The court explained that those decisions could not be combined and relabeled as a hostile work environment, which requires a continuous and pervasive atmosphere of harassment.
The court therefore dismissed the hostile-work-environment claim.
Section 1983 and Bivens Claims
The court ruled that § 1983 applies to conduct carried out under state law and does not provide a claim against federal employees acting for the federal government. Because both named defendants were alleged to be federal employees, Pratt’s § 1983 claims were not legally cognizable as pleaded.
The court also considered whether the claims could be treated as claims under Bivens, a limited, court-created damages remedy against federal officers for constitutional violations. It concluded that they could not proceed under Bivens. The alleged injuries were employment-discrimination injuries covered by Title VII, which the court treated as the available remedy for this federal employment-discrimination claim. The court also noted that Pratt did not identify any separate constitutional rights supporting a Bivens claim.
The court dismissed Count Four, whether it was brought under § 1983 or Bivens.
Remaining Claims and Defendant
The court stated that the remaining claims were Pratt’s Title VII claims for discrimination and retaliation based on sex and race. It ruled that, in a Title VII action by a federal employee, the head of the agency is the proper defendant. Accordingly, Brennan was the only proper defendant, and Shapiro was dismissed from the case entirely.
The court also stated that Pratt’s reference to age discrimination did not create an age-discrimination claim because her Title VII counts did not plead one.
Disposition
The court granted defendants’ Motion to Partially Dismiss. The hostile-work-environment claim and Count Four were dismissed with prejudice. Shapiro was dismissed from the case entirely. The court declined to give Pratt another opportunity to amend because she was represented by counsel and had already amended the complaint after receiving similar arguments. The court directed the clerk to terminate the motion and scheduled a status conference concerning the remaining claims.
Read the full 17-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.