Marotto v. Kellogg Company
- Alvin Hellerstein
- 1:18-cv-03545
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 7
In Marotto v. Kellogg Company, Judge Hellerstein denied reconsideration of his earlier refusal to certify a class challenging Pringles labeling.
Matthew Marotto and the proposed class of post-April 1, 2012 purchasers of Pringles Salt and Vinegar crisps; Kellogg Company, Kellogg USA Inc., Kellogg Sales Company, Pringles LLC, and Pringles Manufacturing Co.
What happened
In Marotto v. Kellogg Company, Matthew Marotto asked the court to reconsider its earlier decision denying certification of a class of people who bought Pringles Salt and Vinegar crisps after April 1, 2012. He alleged that the cans were labeled misleadingly.
Marotto argued that the court acted too quickly, that Kellogg lacked enough information about the labels, and that individual consumer reliance did not matter under New York law. He also challenged the court’s concerns about managing the class and argued that the picture of vinegar on the cans was misleading.
Judge Hellerstein denied reconsideration. He said Marotto had not shown a persuasive reason to revisit the earlier decision, which was supported by differences among the labels, the lack of a method to calculate consumer injury, management concerns, and problems with Marotto’s labeling theories.
The detailed version
- Marotto v. Kellogg Company · No. 1:18-cv-03545
- Alvin Hellerstein
- Jan. 31, 2020
Background
Matthew Marotto moved for reconsideration of the court’s earlier order denying his motion to certify a class. The proposed class consisted of post-April 1, 2012 purchasers of Pringles Salt and Vinegar crisps who asserted claims against Kellogg Company, Kellogg USA Inc., Kellogg Sales Company, Pringles LLC, and Pringles Manufacturing Co. based on allegedly misleading labeling. The court stated that the facts and procedural history were set out in its earlier class-certification order.
Reasons for Denial
The court rejected Marotto’s argument that the class-certification motion had not received full adversarial treatment because the court ruled before he filed a reply. Marotto cited no authority requiring the court to wait for a reply, and the reconsideration briefing did not undermine the court’s prior conclusion.
The court also rejected Marotto’s argument concerning the number of Pringles labels. The party seeking class certification bears the burden of showing compliance with the requirements for a class action. The record showed that Kellogg released twenty different labels during the relevant period, and only four contained the phrase “No Artificial Flavors.” The court said this supported a strong inference that many, if not most, proposed class members did not see the allegedly problematic language. The court was not required to accept Marotto’s assertion that all Pringles sold in New York contained that language.
The court distinguished the absence of a reliance requirement under New York’s deceptive-business-practices statute from the separate requirements of causation and actual injury. Marotto had provided no evidence that the alleged misrepresentations created a price premium and had proposed no method for determining any such premium. The court therefore found that he had not shown how injury could be established with common evidence for the proposed class.
The court said that it had considered manageability—the practical difficulty of handling the proposed class action—as one of several reasons for denying certification, rather than as the sole reason. It also addressed Marotto’s arguments about the depiction of vinegar on the label. To the extent he relied on federal food-labeling regulations, the court stated that Second Circuit authority rejected a private lawsuit based only on violations of those regulations. The court further reasoned that the label disclosed the use of other ingredients, including sodium diacetate and malic acid, and that the depiction of a vinegar bottle did not establish that consumers would infer that vinegar was the only ingredient or pay a premium because of that inference.
The court also noted doubts expressed in the earlier order about Marotto’s typicality and adequacy as a class representative. It said his food-chemistry training could support a defense that he was not misled by the “No Artificial Flavors” label, and that his testimony about learning of the label from his wife supported an argument that his motivation for suing differed from that of other proposed class members.
Disposition
The court denied Marotto’s motion for reconsideration and directed the Clerk to close the motion. The opinion did not certify the proposed class or change the earlier denial of class certification.
Read the full 7-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.