Kunik v. New York City Department Of Education

Background

Rimma Kunik sued the New York City Department of Education, Principal Kaye Houlihan, and Assistant Principal Dorish Munoz Fuentes. The amended complaint asserted claims under Section 1983, a federal civil-rights statute, for retaliation, religious discrimination, age discrimination, hostile work environment, constructive discharge, procedural due process, and municipal liability. Kunik also asserted retaliation and religious-discrimination claims under New York State and New York City human-rights laws.

Kunik had worked at Fort Hamilton High School from 1994 until her departure in 2014 and became a tenured teacher in 1995. The opinion states that she was 69 years old, a native of Russia, and an observant Jewish person. She alleged that, during the 2012–2013 and 2013–2014 school years, she received a difficult schedule, negative performance ratings, unfavorable teaching assignments, and less favorable treatment than younger and non-Jewish teachers. She also claimed that Houlihan failed to give her enough time to submit evaluation-related materials because the deadline fell during Jewish holidays and the Sabbath. Kunik resigned on December 9, 2014.

Claims Remaining Before the Court

In an earlier ruling, the court dismissed Kunik’s Section 1983 claims for retaliation, hostile work environment, constructive discharge, procedural due process, and municipal liability. It also dismissed her state and city human-rights-law claims as time-barred and excluded Section 1983 claims based on events before December 18, 2012. The remaining claims were Kunik’s Section 1983 claims for age and religious discrimination based on later events.

Legal Standard

The defendants moved for summary judgment. Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence shows no genuine dispute over a fact that could affect the result and the moving party is entitled to judgment under the law. In an employment-discrimination case, the plaintiff must first establish a preliminary case of discrimination by showing that she belonged to a protected group, was qualified, suffered a materially adverse employment action, and experienced that action under circumstances suggesting discrimination. If she does so, the employer must provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, after which the plaintiff must present evidence that the stated reason was a pretext for discrimination.

Court’s Analysis

The court rejected the defendants’ argument that Kunik had not adequately pleaded an age-discrimination claim. The court had already ruled that the amended complaint sufficiently alleged such a claim, and the defendants had not presented a compelling reason to revisit that ruling. The court also declined to decide whether the Age Discrimination in Employment Act displaced an age-discrimination claim under Section 1983 because Kunik’s claims failed on the evidence. For the same reason, the court did not address the defendants’ qualified-immunity defense.

The court found that Kunik belonged to protected groups and was qualified for her job. But it held that she had not shown a materially adverse employment action. Her course assignments were not more burdensome than those of her peers and did not depart from normal academic practice. Assigning her to teach English, in addition to English as a Second Language, was not materially less prestigious or unsuitable because she was licensed to teach English. The court also found that the missed summer-school and workshop opportunities did not qualify as materially adverse actions based on the evidence presented. Finally, the court found that the deadline for submitting evaluation materials did not qualify as an adverse action because Kunik had been given additional time and had already been prepared to submit the materials earlier.

The court further held that Kunik had not shown an inference of discriminatory intent. She acknowledged that no one, including Houlihan and Fuentes, had made comments about her age or religion. The court found that her interpretations of the defendants’ attitudes and behavior were conclusory and unsupported by evidence showing discriminatory intent. The court also found that Kunik had not provided enough information to establish that the other teachers she identified as comparators were similarly situated in all material respects, including their qualifications, workloads, evaluation standards, and conduct.

Disposition

The court held that Kunik failed to establish a preliminary case of either age or religious discrimination under Section 1983. Judge Vernon S. Broderick granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, directed the Clerk of Court to terminate the pending motion, and ordered the case closed.