Doe v. New York University

Background

John Doe, a student at New York University’s Tisch School of the Arts, was accused by Jane Roe, another NYU student, of having sexual intercourse with her when she was too intoxicated to consent. NYU’s policy defined non-consensual sexual intercourse to include sexual activity without affirmative consent or when a person was incapacitated. The policy also promised students a fair and impartial process with notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard.

NYU first investigated the complaint and referred it for a misconduct hearing. After the first hearing, Craig Jolley, the Director of NYU’s Office of Student Conduct and Community Standards, found by a preponderance of the evidence that Doe had committed sexual assault. NYU imposed a five-semester suspension and other sanctions. Doe appealed. The appeal panel found that substantial evidence did not support Roe’s alleged incapacitation and concluded that investigators had failed to interview witnesses who might have relevant information. It ordered further investigation and stayed the sanctions.

NYU then interviewed additional witnesses and held a second, new hearing before an external adjudicator. The adjudicator found Doe not responsible for sexual assault, and an appeal panel affirmed that decision. No sanctions were imposed after the second hearing.

Claims and Motion

Doe’s amended complaint asserted against NYU: (1) a Title IX claim based on selective enforcement, (2) breach of contract, and (3) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Against all defendants, he asserted claims under the New York State Human Rights Law and claims for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), which permits dismissal when a complaint does not allege facts sufficient to state a legally valid claim.

Title IX Analysis

The court held that Doe’s Title IX theory was selective enforcement. Under that theory, he had to plausibly allege both that similarly situated female students facing comparable disciplinary charges were treated differently and that sex discrimination was an intentional and motivating factor in the defendants’ actions.

The court found that Doe did not identify any similarly situated female student who received different treatment. His argument that he had been treated less favorably than Roe did not satisfy this requirement because Roe was the complainant, not a similarly situated student accused of comparable misconduct. The court also rejected Doe’s contention that discovery should be allowed to uncover examples of different treatment, explaining that a plaintiff who has not adequately stated a claim is not entitled to discovery.

The court separately held that Doe failed to plead facts supporting even a minimal plausible inference of sex-based discriminatory intent. It found that the alleged failures to interview witnesses did not show sex bias because the investigators declined to interview witnesses identified by both Roe and Doe, and later interviewed the identified witnesses during the additional investigations. The court also rejected Doe’s arguments concerning notice, the sufficiency of the evidence to hold a hearing, alleged neutrality problems, the length of the investigation, and statements about his lack of empathy and remorse.

The court concluded that the alleged procedural problems were, at most, minimal irregularities rather than the clear irregularities needed to support an inference of sex discrimination. It also found that the social-media posts, a newspaper article, the campus #MeToo movement, and guidance from the Department of Education did not establish sufficient public pressure on NYU or the defendants’ knowledge of such pressure. The court noted that any deficiencies in the initial process were addressed through the later investigation and new hearing before a neutral external adjudicator, which cleared Doe.

State-Law Claims and Leave to Amend

Because the Title IX claim was the only federal claim and was dismissed, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction—the authority to hear related state-law claims—over Doe’s remaining claims under state law. The court therefore did not reach the merits of those state-law claims.

The court also denied Doe leave to amend. Doe had made only a brief request for another amendment, provided no details about proposed additional allegations, and had already been given an opportunity to submit a second amended complaint after the defendants identified pleading deficiencies.

Disposition

The court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the amended complaint in its entirety and denied Doe leave to amend.