Redding v. New York State Department of Corrections

Background

Ralph Redding, proceeding without a lawyer, filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his New York state conviction after a jury trial. The jury convicted him of two counts of first-degree burglary, first- and second-degree robbery, two counts of second-degree assault, and third-degree assault. The state court imposed concurrent prison terms, including twelve-year terms for the burglary and first-degree robbery convictions.

The prosecution’s case included testimony from several eyewitnesses who identified Redding. The state trial court found that most of the photographic identification procedures were not improperly suggestive. It found one procedure involving Wallace tainted because Redding’s photograph was a booking photograph while the other photographs were from social-media accounts, but it later found that Wallace had an independent basis for identifying Redding. The trial court also denied Redding’s request to present expert testimony about factors that can contribute to mistaken eyewitness identification, relying on the strength of the identification evidence and other corroborating evidence.

Redding’s state appeals and later petition to the United States Supreme Court were unsuccessful. He then filed this federal petition. The federal report and recommendation was prepared by Magistrate Judge Judith C. McCarthy, who recommended denying the petition in its entirety. Judge Cathy Seibel later adopted that recommendation.

Claims and analysis

The petition raised three grounds: (1) that excluding Redding’s proposed identification expert violated his Sixth Amendment right to present a defense; (2) that New York’s use of the Frye standard for scientific expert testimony violated his right to present evidence and should be replaced by the federal Daubert standard; and (3) that he was actually innocent.

Expert testimony and the right to present a defense

The court concluded that Redding had not fairly presented his Sixth Amendment claim to New York’s highest court. Although he referred generally to a right to present a defense in his request for review, his appellate brief had presented the issue mainly as a matter of New York evidence law rather than as a federal constitutional claim. Because state procedural rules would prevent him from raising the claim later, the court treated it as procedurally barred. The court also found that Redding had not shown a legally recognized reason for the default or that refusing to consider the claim would cause a fundamental miscarriage of justice.

The court alternatively considered the claim on its merits. It held that the state courts’ decision to exclude the expert testimony was not contrary to, and did not unreasonably apply, clearly established United States Supreme Court law. The trial court had considered the multiple eyewitness identifications, the witnesses’ unobstructed views, the absence of evidence that the witnesses coordinated their identifications, and the evidence involving the pizza box. The federal court concluded that the expert testimony would not likely have changed the verdict and that the state court’s evidentiary ruling was not constitutionally arbitrary or disproportionate.

Frye claim

The court denied Redding’s claim concerning New York’s Frye standard. It found that the trial court did not exclude the proposed expert because the testimony failed Frye’s scientific-acceptance test. Instead, the trial court relied on the strength of the identification evidence and its conclusion that expert testimony would not aid the jury. Because Frye was not the basis for the exclusion, the court declined to consider Redding’s challenge to that standard.

Actual-innocence claim

The court denied Redding’s actual-innocence claim on the merits. It explained that such a claim requires new, reliable evidence showing that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found the petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Redding offered no newly discovered evidence; he repeated his argument that the expert testimony should have been admitted. The court therefore found the actual-innocence claim insufficient.

Disposition

The report and recommendation recommended that the petition be denied in its entirety and that no certificate of appealability issue. After the objection period, Judge Cathy Seibel reviewed the recommendation for plain error, found none, and adopted it. The final order dismissed the petition, entered judgment for the respondent, closed the case, and declined to issue a certificate of appealability.