Maria Solange Ferrarini v. Ipek Irgit
- Lorna Schofield
- 1:19-cv-00096
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 3
In Ferrarini v. Irgit, Judge Schofield denied reconsideration of the ruling that Ferrarini’s copyright claim was an ownership claim.
Maria Solange Ferrarini’s motion for reconsideration was denied, leaving the earlier ruling on the defendants’ motion to dismiss unchanged.
What happened
In Maria Solange Ferrarini v. Ipek Irgit, the court considered Ferrarini’s request to reconsider an earlier ruling that her copyright claim was really a claim of ownership.
Ferrarini argued that an ownership claim requires authors to intend shared authorship, and that an ownership ruling could not eliminate her ability to sue for infringement. She also argued that the defendants’ pleadings did not clearly show that they disputed her copyright registration.
Judge Lorna G. Schofield denied the motion for reconsideration. The court said Ferrarini had not identified a change in controlling law, new evidence, a clear error, or an injustice requiring correction, and directed the clerk to close the motion’s docket entry.
The detailed version
- Maria Solange Ferrarini v. Ipek Irgit · No. 1:19-cv-00096
- Lorna Schofield
- Feb. 11, 2020
Background
On January 9, 2020, the court issued an opinion and order granting in part and denying in part the defendants’ motion to dismiss. That opinion concluded that Ferrarini’s copyright claim, as pleaded, was an ownership claim.
Ferrarini then moved for reconsideration, asking the court to revisit that conclusion. A motion for reconsideration asks a court to change an earlier ruling, but the court explained that such a motion generally requires an intervening change in controlling law, new evidence, a clear error, or a need to prevent manifest injustice. It is not a vehicle for relitigating issues already presented.
Arguments and Analysis
Ferrarini argued that an ownership claim exists only when authors intend to share authorship. The court noted that she cited no legal authority supporting that argument and had made the same argument in opposing the defendants’ motion to dismiss.
Ferrarini also argued that dismissing an ownership claim as time-barred would not eliminate a copyright owner’s right to sue for infringement. The court distinguished the authority she cited, explaining that the earlier case involved claims whose main issue was infringement, while Ferrarini’s claims centered on ownership. The court relied on Second Circuit authority stating that when ownership is the decisive issue and the ownership claim is time-barred, related infringement claims must fail.
Finally, Ferrarini argued that the defendants’ pleadings did not clearly show that they disputed her copyright registration. The court pointed to repeated allegations in the complaint that the defendants had claimed the design as their own and had registered it with the United States Copyright Office.
Ruling
Judge Lorna G. Schofield denied Ferrarini’s motion for reconsideration. The court found that she had not identified a qualifying change in law, new evidence, clear error, or injustice. The clerk was directed to close Docket No. 114. The order did not alter the earlier opinion’s disposition of the defendants’ motion to dismiss.
Read the full 3-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.