Patrick v. Local 51, American Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO

Background

Rita Patrick, a member of Local 51, American Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO, had served as a shop steward since 1981 and was reelected in April 2019. In October 2019, she distributed newsletters and a petition concerning what she viewed as financial irregularities involving the union’s accounts and the union president’s conference expenses. Afterward, Union President Shanequa Johnson-Duggins sent Patrick a cease-and-desist letter and, by a November 14, 2019 letter, suspended Patrick’s activities as a Tour 1 shop steward until further notice. The letter did not provide written charges and stated that Johnson-Duggins would file charges under the union’s national constitution.

Patrick alleged that the union and Johnson-Duggins violated Sections 101, 102, and 609 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, including protections for union members’ speech and procedural protections against discipline. She also asserted a state-law breach-of-contract claim. She sought a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction requiring her restoration as shop steward, barring interference with her access to the facility for that role, and prohibiting discipline without the procedures required by the federal labor law.

Legal standard

The court applied the same standard to the temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction requests. Because Patrick sought a mandatory injunction—one that would change rather than preserve the existing situation—she had to make a clear or substantial showing that she was likely to succeed on the merits. She also had to show that she would suffer actual and imminent harm that could not be adequately remedied after trial.

Exhaustion of union remedies

The defendants argued that Patrick should be barred from proceeding because she had not used the union’s internal appeal procedures. The court held that exhaustion was not required in this case. It reasoned that it was unclear whether the union’s appeal rule applied to a temporary suspension rather than a removal, that Patrick alleged violations of free-speech protections, and that it would be unfair to require her to answer charges she had not received in writing.

Likelihood of success

The court found that Patrick had not made the required strong showing on any claim.

For the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act speech claim, the court recognized that the law can protect an elected union official from retaliatory removal or suspension. But the defendants argued that Patrick’s statements about financial impropriety were false and knowingly or recklessly false, and that the issues had already been addressed in union meetings. The court found that these objections could be viable and that Patrick had not shown a clear or substantial likelihood of proving that her statements were protected.

The court also found a disputed factual question about why Patrick was suspended. Patrick presented declarations indicating that Johnson-Duggins connected the suspension to Patrick’s newsletters, flyers, and petitions. The defendants said the suspension instead resulted from Patrick’s alleged failures to perform shop-steward duties, including handling a grievance and responding to workplace incidents. Because the record contained conflicting accounts and discovery had not occurred, the court found that Patrick had not shown a clear or substantial likelihood of proving retaliation.

Regarding Patrick’s claims under the labor law’s disciplinary-procedure provisions, the court noted that those provisions protect members who are fined, suspended, expelled, or otherwise disciplined. Patrick alleged that she was suspended from her shop-steward position, not from union membership. Citing decisions involving union officers and delegates, the court stated that Patrick faced substantial difficulty showing that the suspension of her union position qualified as discipline under those provisions.

The court likewise found that Patrick had not shown a clear or substantial likelihood of success on her contract claim. Her allegations did not identify the specific provisions of the national union constitution that the defendants allegedly violated. The court also noted that courts generally defer to a union’s interpretation of its own constitution unless that interpretation is plainly unreasonable.

Irreparable harm

The court separately considered whether Patrick had shown irreparable harm. Patrick relied primarily on an alleged chilling effect on speech. The court found that she was the only Local 51 member who had asserted such an effect, and that the other declarations did not describe fear of speaking about union matters or retaliation. Patrick remained a union member and could attend and participate in membership meetings, speak on issues, and distribute written materials. The court also viewed the delay between filing the lawsuit, serving the defendants, and serving the injunction application as further evidence that the claimed harm was not sufficiently immediate or extreme.

Disposition

The court denied Patrick’s application for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. It directed the clerk to terminate the motion. The opinion did not finally resolve Patrick’s underlying Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act or contract claims.