Bate v. Berryhill

Background

Stacy C. Bate challenged the denial of her application for Social Security disability benefits. The Administrative Law Judge had found that she was not disabled, and the Appeals Council denied review. Bate’s attorneys, Charles E. Binder and Daniel S. Jones of the Law Office of Charles E. Binder and Harry J. Binder, LLP, later obtained a joint stipulation sending the case back to the Social Security Administration for further proceedings.

The Social Security Administration subsequently found that Bate had been disabled since June 9, 2014. It awarded her $110,126.87 in past-due benefits and withheld $36,754.13, equal to 25% of those benefits, for payment of attorney’s fees. Bate’s agreement with Binder & Binder provided for a 25% contingency fee if benefits were awarded. The firm reported 24.40 hours of federal-court work and sought the full $36,754.13 under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). The Commissioner opposed the request, arguing that the resulting de facto hourly rate of $1,506.32 was unreasonable and excessive.

Legal standard

Under Section 406(b) of the Social Security Act, a court may approve attorney’s fees of up to 25% of a successful claimant’s past-due benefits. The fee must still be reasonable. The court considered the quality of the attorneys’ representation and the results achieved, whether counsel caused delay, and whether the requested amount would be an improper windfall compared with the time spent.

The court explained that the contingency-fee agreement, rather than a traditional hourly-rate calculation alone, is an important indicator of reasonableness. It also considered counsel’s experience, the effectiveness and efficiency of the work, and the fact that Bate had approved the requested fee.

Ruling

The court found that counsel’s representation had achieved the greatest possible success for Bate because the case was remanded and she was later awarded benefits. The court also found that counsel had not caused delay. It concluded that counsel’s experience and effective, efficient work supported the requested fee, even though the de facto hourly rate was high.

The court therefore GRANTED the motion for attorney’s fees in the amount of $36,754.13. Because Bate had previously received an Equal Access to Justice Act fee award of $4,982.48, counsel must refund that amount directly to Bate after receiving the Section 406(b) payment. The court directed the Clerk to terminate the motion.