Sophia v. Decker
- Lorna Schofield
- 1:19-cv-09599
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 11
In Sophia v. Decker, Judge Schofield ordered an individualized bond hearing for detained lawful permanent resident Naishel Sophia but lacked jurisdiction over two removal-related claims.
The order directly affects Naishel Sophia, who was detained during removal proceedings, and the government respondents responsible for his detention and bond hearing.
What happened
Naishel Sophia, a lawful permanent resident detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement during removal proceedings, filed a petition seeking release or a bond hearing with procedural protections. He had been detained for about seven months after a controlled-substance conviction, which he was appealing.
The court held that it lacked jurisdiction over Sophia’s first two claims because they challenged issues arising from his removal proceedings. Those issues could be reviewed through the immigration appeal process and then in the appropriate federal appeals court. The court considered the third claim separately under the constitutional protection against deprivation of liberty without due process.
In Sophia v. Decker, Judge Lorna G. Schofield ruled that Sophia was entitled to an individualized bond hearing because of the length and conditions of his detention and other circumstances. The hearing must require the Department of Homeland Security to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he presents a flight risk or danger, and must consider alternatives to detention and his ability to pay. The court did not order immediate release or bar his transfer, but required a hearing within fourteen days and ordered his release if the respondents failed to provide one.
The detailed version
- Sophia v. Decker · No. 1:19-cv-09599
- Lorna Schofield
- Feb. 14, 2020
Background
Naishel Sophia, described as a native and citizen of the Netherlands Antilles and a lawful permanent resident of the United States, was detained by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement while removal proceedings were pending. He entered the United States in 2011 and became a lawful permanent resident in October 2013. In June 2018, he pleaded guilty to one controlled-substance offense. Immigration and Customs Enforcement arrested him on July 17, 2019, and charged him as removable based on that conviction.
Sophia sought relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, asking the court to prevent the respondents from moving him from New York City while the case was pending and to order his release or an individualized bond hearing with procedural safeguards. He argued that his state conviction was not final because he had obtained permission to appeal it, and therefore could not support mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). The immigration judge rejected his motion to end the removal proceedings. The Immigration Court later found that the Department of Homeland Security had established his removability, and Sophia appealed that decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals. His appeal was pending when this opinion was issued. He had been detained at the Essex County Correctional Center for nearly seven months in conditions the opinion says were identical to those experienced by people serving criminal sentences.
First and Second Causes of Action
The first two causes of action alleged that Sophia’s detention violated the Immigration and Nationality Act and the Fifth Amendment. The court held that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over these allegations because they challenged matters arising from Sophia’s removal proceedings. Under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(5) and (b)(9), review of such questions is available through a petition for review in the appropriate federal appeals court, rather than through a habeas petition in the district court.
The court explained that Sophia’s argument—that his nonfinal conviction could not support detention under § 1226(c)—was a question of law arising from the removal process. The court therefore did not decide whether the controlled-substance offense would support removability or mandatory detention if the conviction were final. The court stated that Sophia could pursue review through the administrative appeal process and then in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Third Cause of Action and Bond Hearing
The third cause of action alleged that the failure to provide a bond hearing with additional procedural protections violated the Fifth Amendment. The court granted the petition in part as to this cause of action and held that due process required an individualized bond hearing to determine whether Sophia’s continued detention was justified.
In reaching that conclusion, the court considered the length of detention, responsibility for delay, whether Sophia had asserted defenses to removal, and the conditions of detention. Sophia had been detained for approximately seven months. The court found no evidence that he was improperly delaying the proceedings; instead, the record indicated that the detention’s length was related to his efforts to proceed with counsel, compliance with the immigration judge’s schedule, and appeal of the removability decision. He had also asserted a defense to removal. Finally, the court found that his detention in a county correctional facility under punitive conditions supported requiring a hearing.
The court rejected the respondents’ arguments that mandatory detention barred a bond hearing and that no hearing was required because government officials had not caused undue delay. The court stated that detention may become unreasonably long and constitutionally problematic even without intentional government delay. The respondents could present their arguments about flight risk and danger to the community at the bond hearing.
Required Procedures and Disposition
The court did not order Sophia’s immediate release or enjoin the respondents from moving him from New York City. It ordered an individualized bond hearing within fourteen calendar days. At that hearing:
- The Department of Homeland Security must prove by clear and convincing evidence that Sophia presents a flight risk or a future danger to the public.
- The decision-maker must meaningfully consider alternatives to detention, including release on recognizance, parole, or electronic monitoring, though those were not the only possible alternatives.
- The decision-maker must meaningfully consider Sophia’s ability to pay if setting a monetary bond.
The respondents had to report the hearing’s result to the court within one business day afterward. If they failed to provide the required hearing, they had to release Sophia within fourteen calendar days of the order. The court’s final disposition was: “the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus is GRANTED.”
Read the full 11-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.