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S.D.N.Y.Procedural orderFiled Feb. 14, 2020

Law Offices of Joseph L. Manson III v. Aoki

Judge
Laura Swain
Docket
1:19-cv-04392-LTS-GWG
Court
U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
Pages
3
Civil ProcedureArbitration
In one sentence

In Manson v. Aoki, Judge Swain denied the law office’s motion to reconsider an order denying arbitration and staying the case pending arbitration.

Who this affects

The plaintiff Law Offices of Joseph L. Manson III and defendant Keiko Aoki; the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration was denied, leaving the January Order in place.

What happened

Law Offices of Joseph L. Manson III v. Aoki involved the plaintiff’s request to reconsider an earlier order that denied the defendant’s motion to compel arbitration and granted the defendant’s motion to stay the proceedings pending arbitration of the plaintiff’s claims.

The court said reconsideration is an extraordinary remedy and generally requires a change in controlling law, new evidence, or a clear error or manifest injustice. It found that the plaintiff had not identified any overlooked legal or factual matter and had declined earlier opportunities to present the arguments it raised in its reconsideration motion.

Judge Swain denied the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration. The order resolved docket entry number 58.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Law Offices of Joseph L. Manson III v. Aoki · No. 1:19-cv-04392-LTS-GWG
Judge
Laura Swain
Date
Feb. 14, 2020

Background

The plaintiff moved under Southern District of New York Local Rule 6.3 for reconsideration of the court’s January 3, 2020 Memorandum Order. That earlier order denied defendant Keiko Aoki’s motion to compel arbitration and granted Aoki’s motion to stay the proceedings pending arbitration of the plaintiff’s claims.

Standard for Reconsideration

The court explained that reconsideration is an extraordinary remedy that is generally denied unless the moving party identifies an intervening change in controlling law, newly available evidence, or a clear error or manifest injustice. It also stated that the motion is not a way to relitigate old issues, present new theories, or make a second attempt at arguments that could have been raised earlier.

Court’s Analysis

The plaintiff argued that the court had overlooked the pending motion to disqualify. The court rejected that argument, explaining that the plaintiff had declined to press the issue when opposing Aoki’s motion to compel arbitration, even though that opposition was filed more than a month after the plaintiff filed the disqualification motion. The plaintiff also had permission to seek a stay of Aoki’s motion to compel arbitration but did not use that opportunity to raise the arguments presented for the first time on reconsideration.

The court further found that the plaintiff had identified no controlling authority requiring a different result and had not shown fundamental unfairness, clear error, or manifest injustice. The court also said it was unclear whether it, rather than a court in the jurisdiction where the arbitration would occur, was the proper forum to decide the plaintiff’s disqualification motion.

Disposition

Judge Laura Taylor Swain denied the plaintiff’s motion to reconsider the January Order. The Memorandum Order resolved docket entry number 58.

The authoritative version

Read the full 3-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

Open opinion PDF →
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