Boykin v. United States

Background

Marco Boykin pleaded guilty to racketeering conspiracy, a crack-cocaine distribution conspiracy, and a firearm offense under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The firearm count charged that he used, carried, and possessed a firearm during and in relation to the conspiracy to murder Lamont Young and Young’s actual murder, and that the firearm was discharged. Boykin received a total sentence of 335 months: concurrent sentences on the racketeering and drug-conspiracy counts, followed by a consecutive sentence on the firearm count.

Boykin sought relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a procedure allowing a federal prisoner to challenge a conviction or sentence. He relied on Johnson v. United States and United States v. Davis. Davis held that § 924(c)(3)(B), commonly called the residual or risk-of-force clause, was unconstitutionally vague. Boykin argued that, because that clause was invalid, his racketeering conspiracy could not qualify as the crime of violence supporting his firearm conviction. The government argued for denial on the merits and also raised procedural default based on Boykin’s appeal waiver and the absence of an appeal.

Court’s analysis

The court did not address the government’s procedural-default argument because it concluded that Boykin’s claim failed on the merits. It explained that the firearm conviction was not predicated on the racketeering conspiracy charged in Count Two. Instead, the relevant predicates were the conspiracy to murder Young and Young’s actual murder, charged in Counts Three and Four.

After Davis, a predicate offense qualifies as a crime of violence under § 924(c) only if it satisfies § 924(c)(3)(A), the “force clause.” That clause covers a felony having as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against another person or property. The court stated that it was unnecessary to decide whether a conspiracy to commit a violent crime could still qualify under the force clause because the actual murder independently supported the conviction.

The court applied the categorical and modified categorical approaches, methods that examine an offense’s legal elements rather than the particular underlying facts. Because New York’s murder statute is divisible, the court consulted the indictment and plea record to identify the relevant subsection. It determined that the charged murder corresponded to New York Penal Law § 125.25(1), which requires intent to cause another person’s death and causing that person’s or a third person’s death.

The court held that intentional murder under that subsection necessarily involves the use of physical force. It relied on Supreme Court precedent stating that intentionally causing bodily injury necessarily involves physical force, including when the injury occurs indirectly. The court also relied on Second Circuit decisions treating murder under New York law as a crime of violence. It distinguished a New York case involving manslaughter based on an omission, explaining that manslaughter and intentional murder have different elements. The court further reasoned that aiding and abetting an intentional murder is also a crime of violence because the underlying murder is one.

Ruling

The court denied Boykin’s motion to set aside his § 924(c) conviction. It declined to issue a certificate of appealability because Boykin had not made the required substantial showing that a constitutional right was denied. The court also found under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that an appeal from the denial would not be taken in good faith.