Mercer v. Rampart Hotel Ventures, LLC

Background

Stacey Mercer sued Rampart Hotel Ventures, LLC, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law. Mercer alleged that she uses a wheelchair and visited Rampart’s website while considering a trip to New Orleans. Although the website described standard suites and other amenities, Mercer alleged that it did not provide information about accessible rooms or the hotel’s compliance with the ADA. She alleged that she therefore could not determine from the website whether the hotel met her accessibility needs or reserve an accessible room in the same manner as other guests.

Rampart owns or operates the French Quarter Suites hotel in New Orleans, Louisiana. The opinion states that Rampart is a limited liability company incorporated and domiciled in Louisiana. Mercer did not allege that she bought a product or service from Rampart through the website, or that Rampart offered hotel accommodations or other goods or services in New York State.

Procedural History

Rampart moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), which allows dismissal when the court lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendant. The court referred the motion to Magistrate Judge Gabriel W. Gorenstein for a Report and Recommendation. Judge Gorenstein recommended granting the motion and allowing Mercer to file an amended complaint. Mercer objected, and Rampart responded.

Personal Jurisdiction Analysis

Because the case involved federal claims against an out-of-state defendant and the ADA does not provide for nationwide service of process in the analysis described by the court, the court applied New York’s long-arm statute. The court focused on New York Civil Practice Law and Rules § 302(a)(1), which requires both that the defendant transact business in New York or contract to provide goods or services there, and that the claim arise from those activities. The plaintiff also must show that exercising jurisdiction would comply with constitutional due-process requirements.

The court rejected Mercer’s argument that Rampart transacted business in New York merely by maintaining an interactive website that accepted reservations and payments. It held that maintaining the website, without more, did not establish a purposeful presence in New York. The website was nationally available and was not alleged to target New York or have a special connection to the state.

The court also held that Mercer had not shown the required connection between Rampart’s alleged New York activity and her claims. Mercer had not made a reservation or other commercial transaction with Rampart. The court rejected her reliance on possible transactions between Rampart and other New York residents because the complaint did not plead facts about those transactions, and those alleged transactions did not form part of Mercer’s claim or establish an element of it. The court stated that the only connection between Mercer’s claim and those possible third-party transactions was that the same website was involved.

The court reviewed the portions of Judge Gorenstein’s recommendation to which Mercer objected under the applicable standards and found no clear error in the remainder of the recommendation.

Disposition

The court accepted and adopted Judge Gorenstein’s Report and Recommendation in its entirety. It granted Rampart’s motion to dismiss, without prejudice, for lack of personal jurisdiction. It also granted Mercer leave to amend her complaint so that she could attempt to allege facts supporting personal jurisdiction under New York Civil Practice Law and Rules § 302(a)(3). The opinion did not decide whether Mercer’s ADA or state and city human-rights claims were substantively valid.