Marshall v. Lilley

Background

Steven Marshall, who was incarcerated in the custody of the New York State Department of Correction and Community Supervision and was proceeding without a lawyer, brought a civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleged that doctors and other correctional employees at Great Meadow, Green Haven, and Woodbourne correctional facilities failed to provide recommended treatment for chronic hip and thigh pain, violating the Eighth Amendment’s protection against cruel and unusual punishment. He also challenged a policy allowing facility doctors to disregard recommendations from outside medical providers. Finally, he alleged that officials retaliated against him for filing medical grievances and cooperating with an investigation by transferring him from a medium-security facility to a maximum-security facility.

Screening standard

Because Marshall had been allowed to proceed without prepaying the filing fee, the court screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b). Those provisions require dismissal of claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, seek money from an immune defendant, or fall outside the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. The court stated that it must read a self-represented litigant’s complaint liberally and interpret it to raise the strongest claims reasonably suggested by the allegations.

Medical-care claims

The court held that Marshall’s allegations against Dr. Paolano did not state an Eighth Amendment deliberate-indifference claim. A deliberate-indifference claim requires both a sufficiently serious medical condition and facts showing that the defendant actually knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm. The court concluded that Paolano’s decision not to provide injections recommended by an outside doctor suggested, at most, a disagreement about medication or treatment. The complaint also indicated that Paolano prescribed Neurontin, one of the treatments the outside doctor had proposed.

The court likewise held that Marshall did not state a claim against Chief Medical Examiner Carl Koenigsmann based on a policy allowing facility providers to exercise their own medical judgment. The court explained that a prisoner does not have a constitutional right to choose a particular treatment if the treatment provided is adequate.

As to Nurse Practitioner Mary Ashong, the court found that Marshall’s allegations—that she refused to increase his Cymbalta prescription and did not timely provide a satisfactory definition of his condition—also described a disagreement over treatment and did not show deliberate indifference. The court noted that Ashong provided medication for the condition.

Marshall alleged that Dr. Mervant Makram, Physician’s Assistant A. Harris-Baker, and Nurse Administrator J. Barrett-Wilson denied him a knee sleeve and a permit allowing him to avoid stairs. The court stated that claims for injunctive relief against these Woodbourne officials were moot because Marshall had been transferred away from that facility. It also stated that the Eleventh Amendment barred official-capacity damages claims against these state agents. For personal-capacity claims, Marshall had to allege each defendant’s personal involvement and awareness of a substantial risk of serious harm. The court concluded that he had not done so.

The court also found that Marshall’s allegations against Superintendent Lynn J. Lilley did not show the required mental state. Lilley investigated Marshall’s complaints and denied the requested accommodations based on information from medical providers stating that Marshall’s back issues were minimal and that there was no medical indication for a flats permit.

Retaliation claim

To state a First Amendment retaliation claim, Marshall had to allege protected activity, an adverse action, and a causal connection between them. The court accepted that filing prison grievances can be protected activity. It nevertheless concluded that Marshall’s allegations did not support the required causal connection. According to the complaint, his transfer followed an increase in his security classification, and the court stated that this suggested he would have been transferred even without a retaliatory motive. The court therefore found that the complaint did not state a § 1983 claim for First Amendment retaliation.

Disposition

The court did not dismiss the complaint at this stage. Instead, because it was unclear whether the defects could be corrected, Chief Judge Colleen McMahon granted Marshall leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days. The amended complaint had to replace, rather than supplement, the original complaint and had to identify the relevant defendants, facts, dates, locations, alleged constitutional violations, injuries, and requested relief. The court stated that no summons would issue at that time and that failure to amend within the allowed period, absent good cause, would result in dismissal for failure to state a claim. The court also certified that an appeal would not be taken in good faith and denied permission to appeal without prepaying fees.