Bethune v. Westchester County

Background

Andrew Bethune, proceeding without a lawyer, sued Westchester County; Westchester County Department of Corrections Commissioner Kevin M. Cheverko; Aramark Correctional Services, LLC; Aramark Food Service Director Manual Mendoza; and Aramark kitchen workers Charles, Coley, Penny, and Craig. He sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a statute that permits claims against state actors for violating federal rights.

Bethune alleged that, while he was a Muslim pretrial detainee at Westchester County Jail, he received meals inconsistent with his religious beliefs. He said he filed nine requests for a religious diet but received no response before filing his complaint, and that staff served him bologna, which he alleged was prohibited by his faith. He also alleged that he received undercooked food, rotten salads, stale bread, and food containing hair and insects. He said he was harmed and needed medical treatment.

The defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint alleges enough facts to plausibly support legal relief.

Claims Against Westchester County and Aramark

Bethune asserted that Westchester County and Aramark were responsible under the rule commonly called Monell liability. That rule generally requires a plaintiff to connect the alleged violation to an official policy, custom, or deliberately indifferent failure to train or supervise, rather than relying only on the employer-employee relationship.

The court held that Bethune’s allegations that Westchester County and Aramark failed to train or supervise employees were conclusory. It also held that his allegations of a longstanding pattern of poor food service were not supported by enough facts. Bethune relied on two prior lawsuits, but the court explained that merely citing lawsuits—particularly lawsuits settled without an admission of liability—did not by itself establish a widespread policy or deliberate indifference.

The court granted the motion to dismiss the Monell claims against Westchester County and Aramark, without prejudice and with leave to replead.

Individual Defendants

A § 1983 damages claim generally requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged violation. The court found that Bethune did not mention Mendoza, Charles, Coley, Penny, or Craig in the complaint’s factual allegations. As to Cheverko, the court found that Bethune’s allegation that Cheverko turned a blind eye to the misconduct was conclusory and did not show direct involvement, notice followed by failure to act, creation or continuation of a policy, or deliberate indifference.

The court therefore granted the motion to dismiss the claims against Mendoza, Charles, Coley, Penny, Craig, and Cheverko, without prejudice and with leave to replead. The court also stated that the same deficiencies defeated any failure-to-intervene claim.

First Amendment Religious-Exercise Claim

The court assumed for purposes of the motion that Bethune had a sincerely held religious belief. It explained that a prisoner ordinarily must allege that government conduct substantially burdened that belief and was not reasonably related to a legitimate prison interest.

The court found that Bethune did not provide enough detail about how often he was denied religiously acceptable meals, whether he complained to staff, whether staff ignored those complaints, or whether he was offered alternatives to eating prohibited food. The court concluded that the allegations might support a claim if supplemented with more facts, but were insufficient as pleaded.

The court granted the motion to dismiss the First Amendment free-exercise claim, without prejudice and with leave to amend.

Fourteenth Amendment Conditions-of-Confinement and Failure-to-Intervene Claims

Because Bethune was a pretrial detainee, the court evaluated his conditions-of-confinement claim under the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Eighth Amendment. The court found that his allegations of undercooked food, rotten salads, stale bread, hair, insects, and resulting health problems plausibly showed an unreasonable risk of serious harm to his health.

But the court found that Bethune did not adequately allege the required state of mind. His general statement that the defendants were aware of the conditions did not identify which defendant knew about the food problems, served the food, or knew about particular incidents. The court therefore granted the motion to dismiss the deliberate-indifference and related failure-to-intervene claims. The opinion does not state a separate prejudice qualifier for that disposition.

Equal Protection Claim

The court treated Bethune’s discrimination and equal-protection counts as one claim based on alleged religious discrimination. To state such a claim, he needed to allege that he was intentionally treated differently from similarly situated people.

The court found that Bethune’s statements that defendants treated him differently from people of other religions, and treated Jewish and Muslim inmates differently from other religions, did not explain how the treatment differed or show intentional discrimination. The court granted the motion to dismiss the equal-protection claim, without prejudice and with leave to replead.

Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act Claim

The court dismissed Bethune’s claim under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. It held that the statute did not authorize his claim for monetary damages against state officers in their official or individual capacities. It also held that his transfer from Westchester County Jail to Fishkill Correctional Facility made any request for injunctive or declaratory relief concerning the earlier conditions moot.

The court granted the motion to dismiss the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act claim, with prejudice.

Religious Freedom Restoration Act Claim

The court held that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act had been invalidated as applied to states and their subdivisions. Because Bethune sued defendants connected to Westchester County and the county jail, the court granted the motion to dismiss his Religious Freedom Restoration Act claim, with prejudice.

Disposition

Judge Nelson S. Roman granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. Bethune was given until April 9, 2020, to file an amended complaint addressing claims that had not been dismissed with prejudice. The opinion stated that failure to file an amended complaint within the allowed time, absent good cause, would result in dismissal of the complaint with prejudice. Claims for declaratory or injunctive relief were dismissed with prejudice, as were the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act and Religious Freedom Restoration Act claims.