Hill v. Miller

Background

Anthony Hill was serving a 50-year New York sentence after being convicted of rape, assault, sodomy, and sexual abuse. He had previously filed a federal petition challenging his state conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, but this Court denied that petition in December 2016, and the Second Circuit upheld the denial in November 2017.

In December 2019, Hill filed a motion under Rule 60(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. That rule allows a party to challenge a judgment as legally void. Hill argued that the New York trial court lacked jurisdiction because the prosecution used multiple amended indictments that had not been submitted again to a grand jury. The Court referred the motion to Magistrate Judge Robert W. Lehrburger, who recommended denying it. Hill objected to the recommendation.

Rule 60(b)(4) issue

The Court partially adopted the amended Report and Recommendation. It agreed that Hill’s challenge was not a proper Rule 60(b)(4) motion. That rule could be used to challenge this Court’s judgment denying Hill’s earlier federal petition, but it could not be used to attack the underlying New York judgment of conviction. The Court explained that treating the motion otherwise could allow a prisoner to avoid the restrictions on second or successive federal petitions.

When a Rule 60(b)(4) motion improperly attacks an underlying conviction, a district court may either treat it as a second or successive federal petition and transfer it to the Court of Appeals for possible authorization, or deny it as outside the rule’s scope. The Court chose to deny Hill’s motion because it found the claim plainly meritless.

Merits of the jurisdiction argument

The Court also held that the New York trial court had jurisdiction over Hill. New York law generally requires a criminal defendant to be indicted by a grand jury. But New York Criminal Procedure Law § 200.70(1) permits certain amendments to an indictment without resubmission to a grand jury when the changes concern matters such as dates, places, names, or similar formal matters, do not change the prosecution’s theory shown by the grand-jury evidence, and do not prejudice the defendant.

The Court found that the first amendment changed only the dates of the charged conduct, and that the later amended and reordered indictment changed only the order of the charges. The Court concluded that these changes did not alter the prosecution’s theory or prejudice Hill, so they complied with § 200.70(1) and did not remove jurisdiction from the New York courts.

Hill separately argued that changes to three counts altered the legal basis of the charges. The Court rejected that argument, finding that the counts consistently charged two counts of second-degree sodomy and one count of second-degree rape under the same New York statutes. The Court also rejected Hill’s argument that the charging language was defective because it referred to conduct involving a person younger than 14, while the statutes referred to a person younger than 15. The Court stated that the charged conduct plainly violated the relevant statutes and that the charging language was valid.

Timeliness and disposition

The Court expressly declined to decide whether Hill’s motion was timely. Because the motion was not proper under Rule 60(b)(4) and was meritless, the Court stated that it would be denied whether or not it was timely.

Judge Kimba M. Wood denied the motion, partially adopted the amended recommendation, declared all pending motions moot, and directed the Clerk of Court to close the case.