Hobbs v. Department of Transportation NYC

Background

Richard P. Hobbs, proceeding without a lawyer, filed a one-page handwritten complaint concerning events at the Staten Island Ferry Terminal. The defendants named in the caption were the New York City Department of Transportation, the United States Coast Guard, Allied Universal Security Guards, the New York City Police Department, and unidentified John Doe defendants.

Hobbs alleged that guards and police officers used their official authority to violate his rights and threatened him with prejudice. He alleged that, when he arrived at the terminal, personnel referred to his homelessness and tried to force him to use the ferry sooner than he needed. He also alleged that they enforced rules against him while allowing others to engage in conduct requiring permits. Hobbs stated that he used a wheelchair and that the defendants violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). He further alleged that, three years earlier, he had been threatened with arrest while campaigning for Trump. He did not request specific relief.

The court had previously allowed Hobbs to proceed without prepaying filing fees. Because he was proceeding without prepayment, the court was required to dismiss the complaint, or part of it, if it was frivolous, malicious, failed to state a legally valid claim, or sought money from an immune defendant. The court also explained that self-represented complaints are read liberally, but still must provide enough factual detail to make a claim plausible.

ADA claims

The court analyzed possible claims under Titles II and III of the ADA. Title II generally prohibits disability discrimination by a public entity, while Title III prohibits disability discrimination in the full and equal enjoyment of a public accommodation.

The court held that the complaint did not state an ADA claim. Although Hobbs identified himself as disabled, he did not allege facts showing that he experienced disability discrimination at the ferry terminal. He also did not explain what any particular defendant did or failed to do that violated the ADA. The court therefore dismissed the ADA claims for failure to state a claim.

Section 1983 claims

The court also construed the complaint as possibly asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal law that allows a person to sue a state actor who violates a constitutional or federal right. A Section 1983 claim requires allegations that a protected right was violated by a person acting under government authority. The plaintiff must also allege each defendant’s direct and personal involvement.

As to Allied Universal Security Guards, the court explained that private security guards generally are not state actors for Section 1983 purposes. A private party may qualify as a state actor in circumstances such as joint action with government officials, government compulsion or control, or delegation of a traditional public function. The court held that Hobbs did not allege facts showing that the security guard was a state actor or explaining how the guard violated his constitutional rights.

As to the New York City Department of Transportation and the New York City Police Department, the court held that New York City agencies generally are not entities that can be sued. The court noted that Hobbs might have intended to sue New York City itself, but a city cannot be held liable under Section 1983 merely because an employee or agent allegedly acted wrongfully. A municipal claim requires facts showing a city policy, custom, or practice caused the constitutional violation. The court found that Hobbs’s complaint contained no such facts.

Federal Tort Claims Act

The court considered whether the complaint might assert claims against the Coast Guard under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). The FTCA waives the federal government’s immunity for certain tort claims involving federal employees acting within the scope of their work, but generally requires the claimant first to submit an administrative claim to the appropriate federal agency and receive a final decision.

The court found no indication that Hobbs had completed that administrative process. It therefore dismissed any FTCA claims against the Coast Guard as barred by sovereign immunity. The court also noted that Hobbs made no allegations against the Coast Guard and did not provide dates for the events, making it unclear whether any administrative claim or court action would be timely. The court stated that this dismissal was without prejudice to any timely and exhausted FTCA claims Hobbs could later bring.

Disposition and warning

The conclusion states that Hobbs’s complaint was dismissed for failure to state a claim and on immunity grounds. In an abundance of caution, the court granted him 30 days’ leave to file an amended complaint addressing the identified deficiencies. The order directed him to submit the amended complaint to the court’s self-represented litigant intake unit within 60 days of the order, label it “Amended Complaint,” and include docket number 20-CV-512 (CM). No summons would issue at that time. The court stated that if Hobbs did not file an amended complaint, it would enter judgment and close the case.

Judge Colleen McMahon also warned that, based on Hobbs’s litigation history, continued abuse of permission to proceed without prepaying fees could lead to an order requiring him to show why he should not be barred from filing new such cases without prior permission. The court certified that an appeal would not be taken in good faith and denied permission to proceed without prepaying fees for an appeal.