DeJesus v. Berryhill

Background

Adane P. DeJesus sought judicial review under Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act of the Commissioner’s denial of her applications for Supplemental Security Income and Disability Insurance Benefits. She alleged that she had been unable to work since September 6, 2011. After an earlier remand and additional administrative hearings, Administrative Law Judge Seth I. Grossman again found that she was not disabled. He found that she had several severe impairments, including asthma, diabetes, hypertension, degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, depression, foot impairments, obesity, and bilateral knee arthritis. He determined that she could perform light work with limitations and could return to her past work as a service attendant.

DeJesus moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the Administrative Law Judge improperly weighed the medical evidence and improperly evaluated her statements about the intensity and effects of her symptoms. The Commissioner cross-moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the decision was supported by substantial evidence.

Medical opinions and symptom evaluation

The court held that the Administrative Law Judge did not properly evaluate the opinions of Dr. Eric Walter, DeJesus’s treating podiatrist, and Dr. Joseph Charles, her treating psychiatrist. The Administrative Law Judge gave little weight to Dr. Walter’s opinions, reasoning that one questionnaire was completed shortly after surgery and that later records showed only mild pain and limited objective findings. The court found that this reasoning was inconsistent with the longitudinal treatment records, which included repeated complaints of pain and findings of limited motion, swelling, deformity, and muscle weakness. The court also found that the Administrative Law Judge did not apply or explain the required factors for evaluating a treating physician’s opinion.

The court further found that the Administrative Law Judge improperly gave great weight to the testimony of Dr. Brovender, a non-treating orthopedic expert. The court described that testimony as vague and noted that Dr. Brovender appeared unfamiliar with portions of the record, including post-surgery imaging showing continuing foot problems.

As to Dr. Charles, the court found that the Administrative Law Judge gave little weight to the marked limitations in Dr. Charles’s 2013 mental-impairment questionnaire without adequately explaining why or applying the required factors. The court also stated that the Administrative Law Judge did not sufficiently account for the mental limitations identified in the record when determining DeJesus’s residual functional capacity, meaning her remaining ability to work despite her impairments.

The court also held that the Administrative Law Judge did not properly evaluate DeJesus’s statements about her symptoms. The Administrative Law Judge had found that her medically determinable impairments could cause the alleged symptoms but that her statements about their intensity, persistence, and limiting effects were not entirely credible. The court found that he did not perform the required analysis of factors such as daily activities, pain, aggravating factors, treatment, medication, and other measures used to relieve symptoms. The court also rejected the reasoning that DeJesus’s reported limitations in daily activities could be discounted because they could not be objectively verified.

Vocational-expert testimony

The court found that the Administrative Law Judge failed to follow the Appeals Council’s instructions concerning vocational-expert testimony. The instructions required hypothetical questions to reflect the specific limitations supported by the record and required the expert to identify appropriate jobs and their incidence in the national economy. Instead, the Administrative Law Judge asked limited questions based on his own assessment and did not present a hypothetical incorporating all of the relevant alleged symptoms and limitations.

Appointments Clause challenge

DeJesus also argued that the Administrative Law Judge had not been constitutionally appointed. She acknowledged that she had not raised that objection before the Administrative Law Judge or the Appeals Council. The court denied this challenge as untimely.

Disposition

The court granted DeJesus’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and denied the Commissioner’s cross-motion. It vacated the Commissioner’s decision denying benefits and remanded the matter to the agency for further proceedings. The court directed that the case be closed.