Chevron Corporation v. Donziger

Background

Steven Donziger filed a pretrial motion in the criminal contempt prosecution arising from this action. The prosecution had been initiated by Judge Kaplan, and Judge Loretta A. Preska had accepted the assignment to try it. Donziger sought the disqualification of Judge Preska and all other judges of the Southern District of New York. The theory, as described by Judge Kaplan, was that Judge Kaplan was biased against Donziger.

Donziger’s arguments

Donziger relied on events that had occurred primarily in 2011. He argued that Judge Kaplan had expressed allegiance to Chevron, suggested the legal theory under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act that the court later sustained, and expressed dismay that Donziger might succeed in enforcing an Ecuadorian judgment and harm Chevron’s business.

Judge Kaplan rejected those characterizations. He stated that Donziger cited no support for the claim that he had expressed allegiance to Chevron. He also said the claim that he had suggested Chevron’s legal theory was contradicted by the record and had been repeatedly rejected. According to the opinion, Donziger relied on a misleadingly edited excerpt from a motion argument, and similar arguments had been rejected in an earlier recusal motion and in a request for appellate intervention.

Judge Kaplan likewise said that he had not expressed dismay about enforcement of the Ecuadorian judgment. He explained that the statement Donziger cited came from the court’s 2011 ruling on Chevron’s request for a temporary restraining order. In deciding that request, the court had to consider issues including the likelihood of success, possible irreparable harm, the balance of hardships, and the public interest. Judge Kaplan described the relevant comments as a provisional interim view and said they were appropriate in that context. He also cited Supreme Court precedent stating that comments based on evidence presented to a judge generally do not establish a basis for disqualification, even when they reflect a view about a litigant.

Legal standard and reasoning

Federal law, 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), requires a federal judge to disqualify himself when his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Judge Kaplan also noted that a recusal request should be made at the earliest possible time after the facts supporting it become known.

The opinion emphasized that the alleged conduct was nearly a decade old and had already been raised in prior efforts to obtain Judge Kaplan’s recusal. The court said Donziger had appealed the 2014 final judgment on the merits, which the Second Circuit affirmed in 2016, but had not challenged Judge Kaplan’s denial of the earlier recusal motion or otherwise argued on that appeal that Judge Kaplan should have recused himself. Judge Kaplan stated that this failure was fatal to Donziger’s renewed attempt and that the earlier ruling had become the law of the case, meaning it could not be challenged later in the same litigation after the opportunity for a timely challenge had passed.

Ruling

The court held that it was not obliged to recuse itself under 28 U.S.C. § 455. The opinion ends with that holding and an order to that effect; the excerpt does not separately use the word “denied” for Donziger’s motion.