Cooper v. Berryhill

Background

Latataura Lannette Cooper sought judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the Commissioner of Social Security’s final decision denying her applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. The administrative law judge found that Cooper had severe impairments including asthma, a fibroid uterus, major depressive disorder, and post-traumatic stress disorder. The judge determined that she had the residual functional capacity for a range of sedentary work, with additional physical, environmental, and mental restrictions, and concluded that she could perform jobs such as document preparer, addresser, and lens inserter. Cooper and the Commissioner each moved for judgment on the pleadings.

Court’s analysis

Cooper raised four arguments. First, she argued that the residual functional capacity finding was not supported by substantial evidence because the administrative law judge relied on Dr. Yevsikova’s statement that Cooper had “mild limitations” in prolonged walking, standing, and sitting. The court agreed. It held that Dr. Yevsikova’s opinion did not explain how those vague descriptions translated into specific work-related abilities, such as sitting for six hours in an eight-hour workday. The opinion therefore did not provide substantial evidence supporting the residual functional capacity finding.

Second, Cooper argued that the administrative law judge violated Social Security Ruling 16-3p by relying on gaps in her medical treatment without asking why she had not pursued treatment regularly. The court noted that the judge referred to periods when Cooper had not sought medical care and to the absence of mental-health treatment after September 2015. Because the judge did not ask Cooper about those gaps, and because the Commissioner did not respond to this argument after being given an opportunity to do so, the court deemed the Commissioner to have conceded that an error occurred. The court directed that, on remand, the administrative law judge ask Cooper why there were gaps in treatment.

Third, Cooper argued that the administrative law judge failed to give good reasons for rejecting Dr. Filopei’s opinion under the treating-physician rule. The court rejected this argument. It concluded that Dr. Filopei was not a treating physician because Cooper saw him only twice and his records did not show the kind of ongoing relationship or detailed longitudinal information required for treating-source status. The court therefore held that the administrative law judge did not err by declining to give Dr. Filopei’s opinions the special weight generally given to a treating physician’s opinion.

Fourth, Cooper argued that the administrative law judge substituted his own opinion for that of a medical expert when determining her residual functional capacity. The court did not decide that issue because its ruling on the inadequacy of Dr. Yevsikova’s opinion made it unnecessary to do so.

Disposition

Judge Gabriel W. Gorenstein granted Cooper’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and denied the Commissioner’s cross-motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.