Bowman v. New York State Housing and Community Renewal

Background

Lorita M. Bowman, proceeding without a lawyer, sued her employer, the New York State Division of Housing and Community Renewal (HCR), and HCR employees Arlene Marder and Margaret Ramroop. She alleged that HCR failed to promote her because of her race, age, national origin, and sex. She also alleged that HCR retaliated against her by transferring her after she filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), and that she experienced a hostile work environment. She asserted claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), and New York Civil Service Law § 61. She also alleged that her right to union representation was violated.

Bowman alleged that she passed a 2017 civil-service examination with a score of 80 percent but was not promoted, while two younger employees with scores of 70 percent were promoted. She filed an EEOC complaint alleging race, age, and national-origin discrimination, but not sex discrimination or a hostile work environment. The opinion states that she was transferred from the Rent Score Operations Unit to the Major Capital Improvement Unit shortly after the EEOC filing. Bowman described the new unit as unfavorable but provided few details about how the transfer changed her work.

Ruling on immunity and federal discrimination claims

The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim.

The court held that the ADEA and § 1981 claims for legal relief against HCR were barred by state sovereign immunity. Legal claims against Marder and Ramroop in their official capacities were also barred. Those claims were dismissed with prejudice and may not be refiled. The court held that claims seeking prospective equitable relief—such as an injunction requiring a promotion—against Marder and Ramroop in their official capacities were not barred by immunity, but dismissed those claims for failure to state a claim.

The court dismissed Bowman’s race, age, and national-origin discrimination claims under Title VII, § 1981, and the ADEA without prejudice because she had not alleged enough facts connecting the promotion decision to a protected characteristic or showing that she and the promoted employees were similarly situated in all material respects. Bowman’s Title VII sex-discrimination claim was dismissed with prejudice because she did not include sex discrimination in her EEOC charge and the court found that the claim could not reasonably be expected to arise from that charge.

The retaliation claims under Title VII, § 1981, and the ADEA were dismissed without prejudice. The court found that Bowman adequately alleged protected activity and a close timing relationship between the EEOC complaint and her transfer. But she did not adequately allege that the defendants knew about the EEOC complaint or that the transfer materially harmed her employment.

The hostile-work-environment claims were also dismissed. The Title VII and ADEA versions were dismissed with prejudice because Bowman did not include a hostile-work-environment claim in her EEOC charge. The § 1981 version was dismissed without prejudice because, even apart from exhaustion, Bowman did not allege facts showing that her workplace was sufficiently permeated by discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, or insult.

Claims against the individual defendants

The court dismissed Title VII and ADEA claims against Marder and Ramroop in their individual capacities with prejudice because those statutes do not permit personal-liability claims against individual employees. The § 1981 claims against them in their individual capacities were dismissed without prejudice because Bowman did not allege that either employee was personally involved in the failure to promote or the transfer decision. The court noted that Marder attended the transfer meeting and Ramroop called Bowman into it, but the complaint did not allege that either person made the decision.

Union-representation claim

The court dismissed Bowman’s claim concerning her right to union representation with prejudice. Bowman did not allege facts showing that she was represented by a union or entitled to union representation. The court also held that, if the right had been violated, the National Labor Relations Board—not the federal district court—was the proper forum.

New York Civil Service Law claim

The court dismissed Bowman’s state-law promotion claims with prejudice. It explained that disputes over New York agency promotion decisions belong in a proceeding under Article 78 of New York’s Civil Practice Law and Rules, and that Bowman had not alleged a prior Article 78 proceeding or facts showing that the claims belonged in federal court.

Final disposition

The court dismissed the complaint but allowed Bowman to refile specified claims. The claims that could be refiled included certain discrimination, retaliation, and hostile-work-environment claims under § 1981; discrimination and retaliation claims under Title VII other than sex-discrimination claims; and certain ADEA claims seeking equitable relief. The order stated that all other claims were dismissed with prejudice and could not be refiled. It set April 15, 2020, as the deadline for an amended complaint and May 6, 2020, as the deadline for the defendants’ answer or objections. Judge Edgardo Ramos directed the Clerk of Court to terminate the motions.