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S.D.N.Y.Procedural orderFiled Mar. 13, 2020

Snyder v. Allen

Judge
Andrew Carter
Docket
1:18-cv-08238
Court
U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
Pages
13
Civil ProcedureMotion to DismissPro SeConsumer Credit
In one sentence

In Snyder v. Allen, Judge Carter granted defendants’ motions to dismiss claims over a credit-report inquiry and related allegations.

Who this affects

Miriam Snyder’s claims against Robert G. Allen, Michael Savino, Teachers Federal Credit Union, and Christine Lobasso/Sullivan; the defendants’ motions were granted.

What happened

In Snyder v. Allen, Miriam Snyder, who was representing herself, sued Robert G. Allen, Michael Savino, Teachers Federal Credit Union, and Christine Lobasso/Sullivan. She alleged that defendants improperly obtained her credit report and violated federal and New York laws, constitutional rights, disability protections, and other legal duties.

The court dismissed the claims it addressed. It held that Snyder’s signed credit application authorized the credit union to obtain her report, that she did not adequately allege state action for her constitutional claim, and that her debt-collection, fraud, disability, conspiracy, and attorney-misconduct allegations were legally insufficient or lacked a private right of action.

Judge Carter granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss. The opinion states that the defendants’ motions were granted but does not add a “with prejudice” or “without prejudice” designation.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Snyder v. Allen · No. 1:18-cv-08238
Judge
Andrew Carter
Date
Mar. 13, 2020

Background

Miriam Snyder sued Robert G. Allen, Michael Savino, Teachers Federal Credit Union, and Christine Lobasso/Sullivan. Snyder was representing herself. She alleged that the credit-union defendants improperly obtained her consumer credit report after she visited a car dealership and pursued an automobile lease. She also asserted claims under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, several provisions of New York’s General Business Law, the federal civil-rights statute covering state action, federal conspiracy statutes, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and New York Judiciary Law § 487.

The credit report showed an inquiry by the credit-union defendants dated January 31, 2018. Snyder alleged that she had not authorized the inquiry and had no relationship with the credit union. The defendants relied on her signed credit application, which authorized the credit union to obtain credit reports in connection with the application and related credit activity. Christine Lobasso/Sullivan responded to Snyder’s dispute and litigation letter, stating that the credit union had a permissible purpose and express authorization to obtain the report.

Standard and pleading treatment

The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which asks whether the complaint states a legally sufficient claim. The court said it would accept well-pleaded factual allegations as true, draw reasonable inferences for Snyder, and read her filings liberally because she was representing herself. It nevertheless declined to consider new claims about the defendants’ membership requirements because Snyder raised those claims for the first time in her opposition papers.

Claims involving the credit-union defendants

The court dismissed Snyder’s Fair Credit Reporting Act claims. A claim under the Act requires allegations that the defendant obtained or used a credit report for an impermissible purpose and acted willfully or negligently. The court found that Snyder’s signed application expressly authorized the credit union to obtain credit reports and that the report was obtained in connection with a credit transaction. It therefore concluded that she had not plausibly alleged a violation. The court also stated that the related New York Fair Credit Reporting Act claims failed for the same reason and noted an alternative argument that some such claims were preempted by federal law.

Claims against all defendants

The court dismissed the claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a remedy for certain constitutional violations committed by state actors or private parties acting under state authority. Snyder alleged violations of the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments, but the court found that she did not allege that any defendant acted under state authority.

The court dismissed the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act claims because Snyder did not adequately allege that the defendants were debt collectors. It also stated that creditors collecting debts they own are excluded from the Act’s definition of “debt collector.”

The court dismissed the New York General Business Law fraud claims because Snyder did not identify specific fraudulent statements, who made them, when and where they were made, or why they were fraudulent. To the extent she alleged that defendants acted fraudulently because she had not authorized the credit inquiry or entered an agreement with them, the court found those allegations contradicted by her signed application.

The court dismissed the Americans with Disabilities Act claim because Snyder did not adequately identify her disability or plausibly allege that defendants were a public entity, knew about her disability, or acted because of it.

The court dismissed Snyder’s claim under 18 U.S.C. § 241 because that criminal statute does not provide a private right of action. It dismissed the claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) because Snyder did not plausibly allege an agreement, discriminatory motive, or the required underlying federal claim.

Claim against Christine Lobasso/Sullivan

The court dismissed Snyder’s claim under New York Judiciary Law § 487. Snyder alleged that Lobasso/Sullivan misrepresented her identity by signing a letter as “Christine Sullivan” even though her attorney registration used the surname “Lobasso.” The court stated that Snyder did not plausibly allege an intent to deceive or conduct sufficiently extreme or egregious to support liability under that statute. It also explained that a plaintiff must plead and prove actual damages caused by the alleged deceit.

Disposition

Judge Andrew L. Carter, Jr. granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss. The opinion does not state that the dismissal was with prejudice or without prejudice.

The authoritative version

Read the full 13-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

Open opinion PDF →
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