Corley v. Vance

Background

Royce Corley sued Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., the New York County District Attorney’s Office, the New York City Police Department, law-enforcement personnel, and private individuals and corporations. The claims included claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, other statutes, and common law. Corley alleged, among other things, that private defendants conspired with government actors to violate his constitutional rights and failed to train employees concerning the release of customer information.

Backpage.com was served on August 16, 2016, but did not answer. After the clerk entered Backpage.com’s default, Corley moved for a default judgment against it. The court limited its discussion to the allegations relevant to that motion.

Claims Against Backpage.com

The court understood Corley to assert seven categories of claims against Backpage.com:

Legal Standard for Default Judgment

Under Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party’s default generally means that the well-pleaded factual allegations are admitted, except allegations concerning damages. But a default judgment is not automatic. The allegations must still be sufficient to state a valid legal claim. A defendant’s default does not admit legal conclusions that are unsupported by adequate factual allegations.

Court’s Analysis

The court applied its analysis from earlier rounds of this case to Corley’s claims under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act and the Stored Communications Act. It found that Corley had not adequately alleged how Backpage.com violated those statutes through its alleged disclosures.

The court likewise found that the constitutional privacy claim failed because Corley did not adequately allege state action or facts showing more than speculation. For a private party to be liable under § 1983, the allegations must show that the party willfully participated in joint activity with the government or that the connection between the government and the challenged conduct was sufficiently close to treat the private conduct as governmental. The court found that alleging only that Backpage.com gave government agencies access to Corley’s accounts did not meet that standard.

The negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim failed because Corley did not allege a duty that Backpage.com owed him and alleged conduct that the court viewed as intentional rather than negligent. The gross-negligence claim failed because Corley did not allege that Backpage.com disclosed information in violation of a constitutional or statutory right.

The court also concluded that the failure-to-train allegation was insufficient. It understood that allegation as a negligence claim and found that Corley had not alleged that Backpage.com owed him a legally recognized duty. The court reaffirmed its earlier conclusion that Corley had not adequately alleged a viable fraud claim against Backpage.com.

The court noted in a footnote that it was unlikely to have personal jurisdiction over Backpage.com, but the ruling on the default-judgment motion rested on the conclusion that none of Corley’s allegations against Backpage.com stated a valid cause of action.

Disposition

The court denied Corley’s motion for default judgment. It also denied Corley’s request for leave to amend because the court found that any attempt to replead the claims against Backpage.com would be futile. Judge Katherine Polk Failla did not enter a default judgment against Backpage.com.