Cruz v. New York City Department of Education

Background

Neysha Cruz brought this Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) action individually and on behalf of her 15-year-old son, O.F., who has developmental impairments, including a brain injury, cerebral palsy, and a seizure disorder. O.F. is non-verbal and non-ambulatory and requires extensive individualized educational services.

During the 2017–18 school year, O.F. attended the International Academy of Hope, or Hope Academy. An impartial hearing officer directed the New York City Department of Education (DOE) to pay his tuition there, and DOE did so without appealing.

For the 2018–19 school year, Cruz moved O.F. to the International Institute for the Brain, referred to in the opinion as the Brain Institute. O.F. began attending the Brain Institute on July 9, 2018. Cruz also filed an administrative complaint seeking a “stay-put” or pendency order under the IDEA. That provision generally requires a school district to maintain a disabled child’s current educational placement while an educational dispute is pending.

Administrative proceedings

An impartial hearing officer initially required Cruz to provide evidence explaining why O.F. could no longer attend Hope Academy before deciding whether the Brain Institute was substantially similar to Hope Academy. A state review officer later ruled that the hearing officer had improperly made the substantial-similarity inquiry depend on that evidence and sent the matter back for further proceedings.

In a prior related federal proceeding, the court vacated the hearing officer’s decision because the hearing officer had not followed the state review officer’s directive to decide substantial similarity. On remand, the hearing officer found that the two programs were substantially similar and ordered DOE to pay O.F.’s tuition at the Brain Institute beginning July 10, 2018.

DOE appealed. On April 5, 2019, the state review officer concluded that the programs were not substantially similar until September 14, 2018, when the Brain Institute began providing O.F. with vision education services. The state review officer ordered DOE to fund the Brain Institute placement from September 14, 2018, through the end of the pendency proceeding. DOE paid $175,962.17 for that period. A newly assigned hearing officer later dismissed Cruz’s underlying administrative complaint as moot because the 2018–19 school year had ended and she had received the relief available in the pendency proceeding.

Claims and motions

Cruz’s federal complaint sought an injunction requiring DOE to pay the Brain Institute’s tuition for the entire 2018–19 school year, including the period from July 9 through September 14, 2018. DOE moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing that the claims were moot. DOE also moved under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.

Court’s analysis

The court held that Cruz’s claim for tuition from September 14, 2018, through the end of the school year was moot because O.F. had completed that school year and DOE had paid the tuition for that period. A moot claim no longer presents a live dispute for the court to decide.

For the July 9 through September 14 period, the court deferred to the state review officer’s thorough and reasoned finding that the Brain Institute and Hope Academy were not substantially similar. The court emphasized that vision education services were an integral part of O.F.’s program. Although both schools’ programs included many similar services, the Brain Institute did not provide O.F. with vision education services until September 14. The record did not show that the Brain Institute worked on O.F.’s vision goals during the first eight weeks, or that missed services had been made up.

Because the programs were not substantially similar during the earlier period, the court concluded that Cruz had no right to obtain tuition payment from DOE for that time. The court did not decide the parties’ separate dispute over whether a parent may receive stay-put funding after unilaterally moving a child to another school when the programs are substantially similar.

Disposition

Judge Gardephe granted DOE’s motion to dismiss. To the extent Cruz sought payment from July 9 through September 14, 2018, the claim was dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6). To the extent she sought payment from September 14, 2018, through the end of the school year, the claim was dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1) as moot. The court denied all other pending motions as moot, directed the clerk to close the case, and entered the order on March 20, 2020.