Gilford v. NYS Office of Mental Health

Background

Tawanna Gilford alleged that the New York State Office of Mental Health (OMH) retaliated against her in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 after she opposed what she viewed as discriminatory employment practices. She worked as a Pre-Release Coordinator and Associate Psychologist at the Central New York Psychiatric Center and was later transferred to the Bedford Hills Correctional Facility.

Gilford alleged that, beginning in February 2016, she complained to superiors about “back door” hiring, unposted positions, and a lack of diversity among people hired into those positions. She also alleged that she was publicly criticized, encouraged to stop sending emails to Human Resources, and had her extra-service hours reduced from 32 hours per month to 24 hours. The hours were restored in November 2016. She filed a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in December 2016 and later filed this action.

An earlier order dismissed Gilford’s disability and family-leave claims with prejudice. It also dismissed as time-barred the part of her Title VII claim based on alleged retaliatory acts occurring before February 10, 2016, but allowed her to amend the remaining Title VII retaliation claim. Gilford filed a Second Amended Complaint, and OMH moved to dismiss it under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which permits dismissal when a complaint does not state a legally sufficient claim.

Legal standard

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must include enough factual allegations to make the claimed entitlement to relief plausible. At this stage, the court assumed the complaint’s well-pleaded factual allegations were true.

A Title VII retaliation claim requires allegations showing that the plaintiff engaged in protected activity, the employer knew about that activity, the plaintiff suffered a materially adverse action, and a causal connection existed between the protected activity and the adverse action.

Court’s analysis

The court held that Gilford adequately alleged protected activity. Taking her allegations in the light most favorable to her, she complained about a specific employment practice—backchannel hiring into unposted positions—that she reasonably believed violated Title VII. Her allegation that she complained about a lack of diversity among people hired into those positions was also sufficient to put OMH on notice that she was opposing conduct she believed was discriminatory.

The court also held that Gilford adequately alleged OMH’s awareness of her protected activity. Her complaints, as alleged, clearly connected the lack of diversity to the unposted positions.

The court concluded, however, that Gilford did not adequately allege a materially adverse employment action or causation. OMH’s alleged explanations for its hiring practices did not constitute adverse action, and the vague allegation that a supervisor justified the hostility Gilford experienced was insufficient. The court similarly concluded that discouraging Gilford from continuing to email Human Resources did not qualify as retaliation on the allegations presented.

The reduction in extra-service hours could potentially qualify as an adverse employment action, but the court found that Gilford had not plausibly alleged a causal connection to her protected activity. She alleged no direct evidence of a connection, and approximately two and a half months separated her complaints about backchannel hiring from the reduction in hours. The court found that the complaint alleged no other facts supporting an inference of causation. The court also noted that allegations about a department-wide reduction in hours were made upon information and belief and therefore disregarded them because the complaint did not provide an adequate factual basis.

Disposition

The court granted OMH’s motion to dismiss. The court dismissed the Title VII retaliation claim because Gilford failed to allege an adverse employment action caused by her protected activity. Counts II through V, asserting claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Family and Medical Leave Act, were dismissed with prejudice because an earlier order had already dismissed those claims with prejudice. The Clerk was directed to close the motion and the case.