Mendez Ramirez v. Decker

Background

Juan Cruz Mendez Ramirez arrived at the United States border in April 2018 when he was seventeen and without authorization to enter. Customs and Border Protection classified him as an unaccompanied alien child and transferred him to the Office of Refugee Resettlement. He was later released under a sponsor-care agreement to live with his mother in New York. He turned eighteen in December 2018.

Immigration and Customs Enforcement arrested him in June 2019 while he was appearing in New York state court. He was detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), which the court described as requiring detention of certain arriving immigrants during removal proceedings. His state misdemeanor charges were later dismissed. His motions to reopen his immigration case and stay removal were granted. An immigration judge later granted his asylum application, but the government appealed that decision.

Mendez Ramirez filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, a procedure allowing a federal court to review whether a person is detained in violation of federal law or the Constitution. He asserted three claims: that Immigration and Customs Enforcement violated the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act and the Administrative Procedure Act by failing to consider the least restrictive setting; that he had not received adequate procedures to challenge his detention; and that his prolonged detention without a bond hearing violated due process. A magistrate judge had recommended granting the petition, but the government objected, so Judge Woods reviewed the disputed issues independently.

Statutory claim

The court held that Mendez Ramirez was not entitled to the least-restrictive-setting determination described in 8 U.S.C. § 1232(c)(2)(B). That provision applies to a person who was an unaccompanied alien child in the custody of the Department of Health and Human Services, reached eighteen, and was transferred to the Department of Homeland Security.

The court interpreted the statutory definition to mean that Mendez Ramirez stopped being an unaccompanied alien child when the Office of Refugee Resettlement determined that his mother was available to provide care and physical custody. In any event, he no longer met the definition after turning eighteen. The court also relied on a regulation stating that a person previously classified as an unaccompanied alien child is no longer one after turning eighteen or when a parent in the United States becomes available to provide care and custody.

Because Mendez Ramirez was not an unaccompanied alien child when Immigration and Customs Enforcement arrested him, the court concluded that the Office of Refugee Resettlement did not retain statutory custody over him and that the least-restrictive-setting requirement did not apply. The court therefore rejected his claim that the government violated the Administrative Procedure Act.

The court disagreed with the earlier recommendation and with a prior district court decision that had reached a different interpretation. It also rejected Mendez Ramirez’s arguments that unaccompanied-alien-child status continues until an agency formally revokes it, that the court’s interpretation produced an absurd result, and that the relevant statutory provisions conflicted with mandatory detention rules. The court interpreted the least-restrictive-setting provision as informing the Department of Homeland Security’s discretionary parole authority rather than eliminating mandatory detention for arriving immigrants who do not qualify for the special protections.

Due process claims

The court treated Mendez Ramirez as an arriving immigrant for constitutional purposes even though he had lived in the United States after being released to his mother. Under this treatment, he remained subject to mandatory detention because he had not been determined clearly and beyond a doubt to be entitled to admission.

Relying principally on the Supreme Court’s decision in Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, the court held that the procedures Congress authorized for an arriving immigrant at the threshold of initial entry satisfied due process. The court concluded that an immigration judge was not required to hold a bond hearing for Mendez Ramirez and that his detention therefore did not violate due process.

The court also said that, even if it applied a separate set of factors addressing prolonged detention, the result would be the same. It noted that his detention had lasted about ten months, that some delays resulted from efforts to obtain counsel, and that he had asserted an asylum claim that an immigration judge granted. Factors favoring him included the conditions at the detention facility, the COVID-19 pandemic, and reported deterioration in his mental health. After weighing the factors, the court described the issue as close but concluded that continued detention did not violate due process.

Disposition

Judge Gregory H. Woods denied the petition for detention relief. He also denied Mendez Ramirez’s request for emergency relief under Mapp v. Reno, directed the clerk to enter judgment for the respondents, and ordered the case closed. The court did not order release, but it encouraged Immigration and Customs Enforcement to reconsider its discretionary parole decision in light of Mendez Ramirez’s age, lack of criminal convictions, mental-health concerns, risk from COVID-19, mother’s willingness to take custody, and the immigration judge’s asylum decision.