Farooqi v. New York City Department Of Education

Background

Mahmooda Farooqi sued the New York Department of Education (DOE), Kinsley Kwateng, Clive Pryce, and John Lacroix. The opinion states that Farooqi was born in India, identified as East Asian Indian, had worked for the DOE since 2001, and had been a Chemistry teacher at Benjamin Banneker Academy for Community Development from 2006 until 2018.

In July 2018, the DOE brought eight charges against Farooqi, including allegations of corporal punishment or unnecessary physical contact with students, failure to supervise, and interference with students’ participation and well-being. After a 12-day hearing under Section 3020-a of the New York Education Law, an arbitrator sustained one corporal-punishment charge and a classroom-abandonment charge. The arbitrator did not terminate Farooqi, but imposed a $6,000 fine and required training. Farooqi was later reassigned from Benjamin Banneker and performed clerical work.

Farooqi’s amended complaint asserted several claims, including age discrimination, malicious abuse of process, stigma-plus discrimination, alienage and race discrimination under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, and retaliation under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). At an earlier conference, the court granted judgment to the defendants on the age-discrimination, malicious-abuse-of-process, and stigma-plus claims. This opinion addressed only the Sections 1981 and 1983 claims for alienage and race discrimination. The FMLA retaliation claim was not part of this ruling.

Motion and legal standard

The defendants moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) for judgment on the pleadings. The court explained that this procedure uses the same standard as a motion under Rule 12(b)(6): the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true and draws reasonable inferences for the nonmoving party. The court may consider the pleadings, documents attached to or incorporated into them, documents integral to the complaint, and matters subject to judicial notice.

Court’s analysis

The court held that claims under Sections 1981 and 1983 required Farooqi to establish that discriminatory intent was the “but-for” cause of the adverse employment action. In other words, she had to show that the disciplinary proceedings would not have occurred without the alleged race or alienage discrimination. The court relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Comcast for Section 1981 and Second Circuit precedent for Section 1983, and rejected the argument that the less demanding “motivating factor” standard applied.

The court also held that the arbitrator’s factual determinations had preclusive effect in federal court. Because the arbitrator had sustained misconduct charges and imposed sanctions, Farooqi could not establish that the disciplinary action would not have occurred but for her race or alienage. The opinion noted that preclusion required an adequate, full, and fair opportunity to litigate the issues, and stated that Farooqi did not argue that she lacked such an opportunity.

Ruling

Judge Denise Cote granted the defendants judgment on Farooqi’s alienage and race discrimination claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983. The opinion states that the only remaining claim was Farooqi’s FMLA retaliation claim and that a concurrently filed order set the schedule for litigating it.