Marchetta v. United States

Background

Leonard Marchetta moved under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct his criminal sentence. He had pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute oxycodone and received a principal sentence of 135 months’ imprisonment. His plea agreement contained a stipulated Guidelines range of 108 to 135 months, although it stated that the range did not bind the court. His direct appeal was partly dismissed and otherwise summarily affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

Marchetta claimed that his attorney advised him to accept the plea agreement based on an assurance that he would receive a 60-month sentence, used incorrect drug amounts in calculating the Guidelines, failed to recognize that the sentence was outside the stipulated range, and failed to object when the government allegedly breached the plea agreement. He also claimed that retained counsel abandoned him during the direct appeal, leaving him to proceed without a lawyer.

Legal standard

The court applied the two-part test for ineffective assistance of counsel. Marchetta had to show both that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that the alleged error caused prejudice—meaning a reasonable probability that the result would have been different. The court also explained that a waiver of the right to challenge a sentence is generally valid when it was entered knowingly and voluntarily.

Claims concerning the guilty plea and sentence

The court rejected Marchetta’s claim that counsel wrongly told him he would receive no more than 60 months. During the plea hearing, Marchetta stated under oath that he was satisfied with counsel, had reviewed the plea agreement with counsel, understood the possible sentence, and understood that sentencing estimates were not binding on the court. He also acknowledged that he could not appeal or collaterally challenge a sentence within or below the stipulated Guidelines range. The court found that these sworn statements contradicted his later unsworn assertions.

The court also rejected the challenge to the drug-quantity calculation. The Guidelines calculation used 3,741.36 grams of actual oxycodone, which the applicable drug-equivalency table converted to 25,067.112 kilograms of marijuana. The court stated that the actual weight of the oxycodone was undisputed and that the alternative calculation based on the number of pills or doses was not appropriate because the drug’s weight was known.

Abuse-of-trust enhancement and alleged breach

The court upheld the two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3. It found that Marchetta used his training and license as a physician assistant—a “special skill” not possessed by the general public and requiring substantial education, training, or licensing—to write prescriptions for medically unnecessary oxycodone, thereby significantly facilitating the offense.

The court also found that the government did not breach the plea agreement. The government told the sentencing court that it stood by the agreement and was not seeking the enhancement, while explaining its position after the court asked about the enhancement. The plea agreement allowed the parties to respond to the court’s questions and make appropriate arguments concerning a different Guidelines calculation or a sentence outside the stipulated range. Because the government’s response fell within that provision, the court concluded that counsel was not ineffective for failing to object.

Appeal-counsel claim and disposition

The court did not reach the merits of Marchetta’s claim that he was denied counsel on direct appeal. It stayed that portion of the section 2255 motion pending an application by Marchetta, within 60 days, to the Second Circuit to recall the mandate, reopen the appeal, and appoint counsel.

The court concluded that the motion was denied except for the portion asserting abandonment by appeal counsel, which was stayed. It declined to issue a certificate of appealability for the claims decided in the order and certified that any appeal from the order would not be taken in good faith; it also denied permission to appeal without paying filing fees.