Clayton v. United States

Background

Conroy Clayton pleaded guilty on January 10, 2011, to Count One, conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951, and Count Four, brandishing a firearm in connection with that conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) and 2. The court sentenced him to 24 months on Count One followed by an 84-month mandatory consecutive sentence on Count Four. The judgment was entered on August 12, 2011.

The indictment also charged attempted Hobbs Act robbery in Count Two and identified a narcotics conspiracy in Count Three as additional possible predicates for the firearm charge. Clayton did not plead guilty to Count Two; the government moved to dismiss it at sentencing. Clayton was not charged in Count Three. His plea agreement identified Count One as the predicate offense for Count Four, and during his plea hearing he admitted participating in a conspiracy to commit armed robbery and brandishing a gun in connection with it.

Legal Framework

Section 924(c) requires a mandatory consecutive sentence when a defendant uses or carries a firearm during and in relation to a federal crime of violence or drug-trafficking crime. At the time of Clayton’s conviction, the statute defined a crime of violence through both an elements clause and a residual clause. The residual clause covered felonies that, by their nature, involved a substantial risk that physical force might be used.

In United States v. Davis, the Supreme Court held that the residual clause in § 924(c)(3)(B) was unconstitutionally vague. The Second Circuit later held that conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery was not a valid § 924(c) predicate after Davis. Clayton therefore sought relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which permits a federal prisoner to challenge a conviction or sentence imposed in violation of federal law or the Constitution.

Procedural-Default Issue

The government argued that Clayton’s claim was procedurally barred because he did not raise it on direct appeal. A procedurally defaulted claim generally cannot be raised later unless the petitioner shows cause and actual prejudice or actual innocence.

The court held that Clayton showed cause and actual prejudice. When he could have appealed, binding Second Circuit precedent treated conspiracy to commit a violent crime as a crime of violence under § 924(c). The court concluded that any argument that his robbery-conspiracy conviction was not a valid predicate would have been rejected at that time. Clayton was therefore not barred from bringing the § 2255 petition.

Merits

The court held that Count One was not a valid predicate for Count Four after Davis because conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery qualified only under the unconstitutional residual clause.

The government also argued that Counts Two and Three could independently support Count Four. The court recognized that an offense to which a defendant did not plead guilty can sometimes serve as a § 924(c) predicate if there is legally sufficient proof that the defendant committed it. But the indictment alone was not enough. Clayton’s plea allocution established his participation in the robbery conspiracy and his brandishing of a firearm, but he did not admit participating in attempted Hobbs Act robbery or in a narcotics conspiracy. His statement that the conspiracy involved cocaine was made in response to a question concerning interstate commerce and did not establish that he committed the conduct charged in Counts Two or Three.

Disposition

Because Count One was no longer a valid predicate and the record did not provide legally sufficient proof that Counts Two or Three could serve as alternative predicates, the court granted Clayton’s petition and vacated his conviction and sentence on Count Four. The court stated that it would hold a teleconference with counsel to set a time for resentencing on Count One. The opinion notes that Clayton had been removed from the United States but sought to proceed with resentencing.