Straw v. Wolters Kluwer United States Inc.
- Louis Stanton
- 1:20-cv-03251
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 9
In Straw v. Wolters Kluwer United States Inc., Judge Stanton dismissed a pro se complaint alleging disability retaliation and emotional distress over a published disciplinary decision.
Andrew U.D. Straw’s federal ADA retaliation claim, state intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim, and request for a declaration concerning the Indiana disciplinary decision were dismissed; the opinion does not state whether the dismissal was with or without prejudice.
What happened
In Straw v. Wolters Kluwer United States Inc., Andrew U.D. Straw sued Wolters Kluwer United States, Inc., Lisa G. Lerman, Philip G. Shrag, and Robert Rubison. He alleged that they retaliated against him under the Americans with Disabilities Act by publishing information about his Indiana law-license suspension.
Straw also asked the court to declare that his earlier lawsuit against the American Bar Association was not frivolous and asserted a New York claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The defendants’ book described the Indiana disciplinary decision, which was publicly available.
Judge Louis L. Stanton dismissed the complaint. The court held that it could not review the Indiana Supreme Court’s decision, that Straw had not adequately alleged disability retaliation, and that publishing information about the disciplinary proceeding was not extreme and outrageous conduct supporting his state-law claim.
The detailed version
- Straw v. Wolters Kluwer United States Inc. · No. 1:20-cv-03251
- Louis Stanton
- May 1, 2020
Background
Andrew U.D. Straw, representing himself, filed claims against Wolters Kluwer United States, Inc., Lisa G. Lerman, Philip G. Shrag, and Robert Rubison. He alleged that he has severe physical and mental disabilities. Wolters Kluwer published a legal-ethics book that described an Indiana Supreme Court disciplinary decision suspending Straw from practicing law after finding violations of Indiana Professional Conduct Rule 3.1, which concerns bringing proceedings without a nonfrivolous legal and factual basis.
Straw alleged that publishing the account retaliated against him for filing a disability-discrimination lawsuit against the American Bar Association. He invoked the Americans with Disabilities Act’s anti-retaliation provision. He also asserted a claim under New York law for intentional infliction of emotional distress and sought a declaration that his earlier American Bar Association lawsuit was not frivolous. He stated that he was not bringing a defamation claim.
The court had previously allowed Straw to proceed without paying the filing fee in advance. In reviewing a complaint filed under that procedure, the court was required to dismiss claims that were frivolous, failed to state a legally sufficient claim, sought relief from an immune defendant, or fell outside the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.
Rulings
Challenge to the Indiana disciplinary decision. The court concluded that Straw’s requested declaration was, in substance, an attempt to have a federal district court review and overturn the Indiana Supreme Court’s disciplinary judgment. Federal district courts cannot act as appellate courts reviewing state-court judgments. The court therefore dismissed this claim for lack of jurisdiction.
Americans with Disabilities Act retaliation. The court explained that an ADA retaliation claim requires facts showing protected activity, the defendant’s knowledge of that activity, an adverse action, and a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action. The court held that Straw did not plead facts satisfying the third and fourth requirements. It concluded that publishing an accurate account of the Indiana disciplinary decision, even if Straw disagreed with that decision, was not an adverse action. It also found no facts suggesting that the book used the disciplinary decision because of retaliatory intent related to Straw’s opposition to disability discrimination. The court therefore held that Straw failed to state an ADA retaliation claim.
Intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court applied New York law, which requires extreme and outrageous conduct, intent to cause severe emotional distress, a causal connection to the injury, and severe emotional distress. It held that publishing information about Straw’s disciplinary proceedings did not constitute extreme and outrageous conduct, particularly because the full disciplinary decision was publicly available. The court dismissed these allegations for failure to state a claim.
Disposition
The court dismissed the complaint filed under the fee-waiver statute. The opinion does not state that the dismissal was with or without prejudice. The court also noted that it could decline supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claim after dismissing the federal claims, but it addressed the state-law claim because it was unclear whether Straw might be able to invoke diversity jurisdiction.
Read the full 9-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.