Stinson v. City University of New York

Background

Marcus Stinson filed this action against City University of New York, Judith Bergtraum, and Vincent Green. He alleged that the defendants unlawfully retaliated against him after his termination in August 2017. The opinion states that the amended complaint asserted claims under Title VI and potentially Title VII concerning the defendants’ alleged opposition to his application for unemployment benefits.

The case was initially dismissed as prematurely filed by Judge Stanton. Stinson later sought reconsideration, although he also submitted a letter saying that his reconsideration request had been mailed in error and that he did not want reconsideration. The reconsideration request was nevertheless granted, and Stinson filed an amended complaint. The defendants then filed a motion to dismiss.

Stinson did not oppose that motion. Instead, he asked to transfer the case to the Eastern District of New York, where he had another pending civil action involving defendants. Before the transfer request was resolved, he moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2) to dismiss this case without prejudice.

Parties’ Positions

Stinson did not expressly state why he sought dismissal, but his filings indicated that he intended to pursue the matter in the Eastern District. He also explained that most of his claims were already presented in that other action.

The defendants opposed dismissal. They argued that Stinson was engaging in forum shopping and attempting to avoid the first-filed rule, which generally gives priority to the case filed first when related actions are pending. They also characterized him as a frequent filer of baseless employment-discrimination lawsuits against them.

Legal Standard

Rule 41(a)(2) allows a plaintiff to dismiss an action by court order on terms the court considers proper. Unless the order says otherwise, the dismissal is without prejudice. The court applied five factors from Zagano v. Fordham University: the plaintiff’s diligence, any improper or harassing motive, how far the case had progressed, the possibility of duplicated litigation expenses, and the adequacy of the plaintiff’s explanation.

No single factor controlled the decision. The court also gave special consideration to Stinson’s status as a self-represented litigant.

Court’s Analysis

The court found that the diligence factor favored dismissal. Although the case had been pending for nearly two years, much of the delay resulted from the earlier dismissal and the later reconsideration ruling. Stinson filed his dismissal motion about six months after filing the amended complaint, before the court decided the defendants’ motion to dismiss.

The court treated the improper-motive factor as neutral. It acknowledged the defendants’ concerns about Stinson’s overlapping cases and forum selection, but concluded that the record did not establish that he filed the Eastern District action to harass the defendants or with an improper motive. Given the procedural confusion created by the earlier dismissal and reconsideration proceedings, the court found it understandable that a self-represented litigant might have been confused about where to proceed.

The progress-of-the-case factor favored dismissal. The only major activity in this case was the defendants’ motion to dismiss and related letters. There had been no discovery, summary-judgment briefing, trial preparation, or decision on a substantive motion. The court therefore found that the case remained at an early stage and that the defendants had not expended significant resources.

The duplication-of-efforts factor also favored dismissal. The court concluded that the work already performed by the defendants could remain useful if the claims were pursued in the Eastern District. The possibility of having to litigate again, without more, was not sufficient legal prejudice to deny dismissal.

The court found Stinson’s explanation arguably questionable but not enough to defeat his motion. It concluded that the possible forum-shopping concern, standing alone, did not outweigh the other factors, particularly because the case was at an early stage and Stinson was self-represented.

Disposition

The court granted Stinson’s motion to dismiss without prejudice under Rule 41(a)(2). It denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss as moot, directed the clerk to terminate pending motions, and closed the case. The opinion did not decide whether Stinson’s retaliation or Title VI and Title VII claims had merit.